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Abstract 
Work experience is a key factor in hiring decision of managers. However, empirical 
evidence that early life experience matters is very limited.1 This thesis fills in the gap 
by examining how work experience affects managerial performance and managerial 
style in mutual funds. Using a sample of Chinese fund managers, we find 
performances and styles vary across managers of different career backgrounds. 
Notably, managers of research and especially government backgrounds show higher 
risk adjusted returns while taking on less systematic risk. Further analyses on holdings 
characteristics suggest that they possess information advantage through prior work 
experience. In contrast, managers with experience in other investments generate high 
raw returns largely by holding more systematic risk and chase momentum. These 
effects persist even after controlling for both fund and time fixed effects. However, 
the strong market-timing ability is presented by all fund managers with these three 
backgrounds. Fund managers of banking backgrounds perform the worst, but they 
show high ability in attracting new money flow. Then we continue to prove that one 
explanation for information advantages to be obtained is manager’s political 
connection relation. We find managers with political background outperform others. 
And they also have strong stock-picking and market-timing abilities to manage their 
portfolio. Overall, we provide evidence that work experience matters for performance 
and management style. 
 
 
Key Words: Early Life Experience; Career Path; Political Connection; Information 
Advantage; Stock-picking Ability; Market-timing Ability; Chinese Mutual Fund 
Market
                                                          
1 In finance context, most of the available evidences are from corporate finance 
research. See Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2012), Malmendier et al. (2011), Schoar 
and Zuo (2011), and Dittmar and Duchin (2013). 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Human capital in management is one of the key factors by which enterprises obtain 
and maintain their competitive advantage (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The 
formation of human capital is a cumulative process. Managers do not gain their 
expertise by simply sitting in MBA classes. Knowledge and speciality accumulated 
along career paths ultimately contribute to managerial performance. In practice, 
considerable emphasis is placed on work experience in hiring decisions. However, 
empirical evidence that work experience matters is very limited. Managers obtain 
various relationships or information through their prior work experience that affect 
their managerial performance. Then, there is also the question of management styles. 
For example, investment principles that are advocated in MBA classrooms are more 
or less the same, but fund managers’ investing styles differ, even within a fund style 
category. Little is known about how work experience shapes managers’ management 
style. The aim of this thesis is to fill in these gaps.  
 
1.1 Overall Literature Review and Motivation 
Although the business press regularly cites the influences of corporate executives’ 
background on operations, corporate strategies and performance, surprisingly, there 
have been few empirical studies on these relationships. This could be related to the 
traditional belief that managers have heterogeneous talents and abilities that map onto 
firm performance and decisions or because many management characteristics are 
unobservable.  
 
Neoclassical economic theory posits that individuals are rational optimizers who have 
no influence on corporate decision idiosyncratically (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). 
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While acknowledging that individuals differ in attributes, financial economics also 
holds that the role of noneconomic, manager-specific influence on corporate outcomes 
is limited (see Bamber, Jiang and Wang, 2010). In contrast, in the strategic 
management literature, Hambrick and Mason (1984) theorize that corporate strategic 
choices and performance are at least partially affected by managerial background 
characteristics (e.g., functional career tracks, career experiences, age, socioeconomic 
roots, financial positions and education). That is, managers draw on the skills and 
perspectives that they gained throughout their prior careers when making corporate 
decisions. Following the suggestion of Hambrick and Mason (1984), researchers in 
the management field show considerable research interest in examining how 
executive characteristics are manifested in corporate outcomes (e.g., Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Palmer and Barber, 2001; Jensen and Zjac, 2004). For instance, 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) find that firms with management teams that are 
characterized by younger age, shorter organizational tenure, longer team tenure and 
higher educational level are more likely to undergo corporate strategy change. Smith 
and White (1987) confirm that managers pursue strategies that are in line with their 
functional experiences.  
 
In the past decade or so, archival research in Accounting and Finance began to 
explore the idiosyncratic influence of individuals on corporate decisions. In their 
seminal work, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) identify specific managerial styles with 
respect to firm decisions and find that managerial styles are especially important for 
acquisition and dividend decisions, dividend policy, interest coverage and cost-cutting 
policy. Graham, Harvey and Puri (2010) provide evidence that CEO behavior is 
associated with overconfidence (see also, Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005) 
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and that U.S.-based CEOs are more optimistic than their non-U.S. counterparts 
(Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Kaplan et al. (2012) find that CEOs with greater 
overall talent are associated with better performance. Moreover, male CEOs exhibit 
relative overconfidence (Huang and Kisgen, 2013) and tend to have a higher debt 
ratio (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Finally, firms with higher historical and future 
growth rates tend to be run by younger CEOs. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest 
that the age of a manager affects his/her value and, thus, his/her decisions. Palsson 
(1996) finds an association between age and risk aversion in portfolio holdings. In 
addition, managers with MBAs tend to make more aggressive resource allocation 
decisions (Gintis and Khurana, 2008) and exhibit more accurate forecasts (Bamber, 
Jiang and Wang, 2010). While military personnel tend to be less tolerant of ambiguity 
(Soeters, 1997), individuals with military experience tend to be conservative (Franke, 
2001), and managers with military experience tend toward prompt disclosure of 
unfavorable information (Bamber, Jiang and Wang, 2010). In contrast, Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan (2011) observe that CEOs with prior military experience tend to borrow 
more.  
 
There are also papers that explore the effect of managers’ prior life experiences with a 
focus on seismic early-life events, including the Great Depression and associated 
stock market crash. For instance, there is evidence that CEOs who lived through the 
Great Depression tend to have lower leverage levels in the 1940s (Graham and 
Narasimhan, 2004) and that CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression display a 
heightened reluctance to access external capital markets (Malmendier et al., 2011). 
Schoar (2011) observes that CEOs who begin their careers during a recession choose 
more conservative capital structures. Malmendier et al. (2008) suggest that managers 
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who experienced lower stock returns during their investment lives are more 
conservative.  
 
At present, however, fewer people follow stable career patterns, and experience in a 
single firm represents only a small proportion of most individuals’ overall work 
experience (e.g., Hall, 2002). Prior research examining the effect of management 
background characteristics on corporate decisions overlooks the importance of prior 
work experiences that executives acquired in prior firms (Goldsmith and Veum, 
2002). Prior work experience includes not only relevant knowledge and skills but also 
social network and political connections, etc. The upper echelons theory developed by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argues that managers’ functional career track (e.g., 
accounting and finance) affects their decisions. Therefore, the question of how 
managers’ career paths affect corporate performance has not been adequately 
addressed. Recently, there have been very few attempts to examine the relationship 
between individual career paths and corporate performance. Dokko et al. (2009) 
provide indirect evidence that an individual’s prior related experience has a positive 
effect on job performance. Specifically, the effects of prior related experience on the 
current firm diminish the longer a person is employed. Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) 
demonstrate support for the theoretical notion that as firms mature, they require CEOs 
with different skills and provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this 
prediction. Ryan and Wang (2011) find that varied-experience CEOs (CEOs who 
have worked for more employers) improve firm value and operating performance and 
are more likely to change firm policies. In an investigation of the influence of 
managers’ prior experiences on corporate disclosure styles, Bamber et al. (2010) 
report that mangers promoted from accounting and finance tend to be more 
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conservative and to underestimate upcoming earnings. In contrast, managers from 
legal backgrounds are more sensitive to litigation risk and favor disclosure styles that 
guide expectations down. 
 
However, in the fund industry, the effect of prior work experience (specifically, career 
paths) has never been studied. The large extant literature associates fund performance 
with fund managers’ personal characteristics. Most of those studies focus on manager 
characteristics related to education. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the 
educational background of mutual fund managers and find that those who attended 
undergraduate institutions that required higher SAT scores have systematically higher 
risk adjusted excess returns. Later studies incorporate other manager characteristics 
such as sex (Atkinson, Baird, and Frye, 2003), quality of the MBA program attended 
(Gottesman and Morey, 2006) and tenure (e.g., Martijin, Cremers, and Petaisto, 2009, 
Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009). Li, Zhang, and Zhao (Forthcoming) link hedge 
fund managers’ characteristics such as education to hedge fund performance. They 
document that managers from higher SAT institutions tend to have high returns and 
take fewer risks. Therefore, our study complements that literature. 
 
1.2 Data Selection Background 
In this thesis, we provide evidence of the effect of work experience on managerial 
performance and management style by examining the connection between Chinese 
mutual fund managers’ work experiences prior to their fund management career and 
their fund management performances and styles in the Chinese mutual fund market. 
The mutual fund setting is appropriate for assessing the effect of work experience on 
managerial performance and style. Because the fund manager is the most important 
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factor in fund management, manager performance and style can be measured 
relatively easily and can be attributed to individual characteristics relatively cleanly. 
The study of fund managers can also provide some insight into how the effect of work 
experience on management style and managerial performance are intercorrelated. 
Fund managers use their “edge” in seeking abnormal returns (e.g., geographical 
proximity (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). They incorporate the “edges” that they 
accumulate along their career path into their management styles. For example, years 
spent in a research department can provide managers with understandings of specific 
industries. Their portfolios are likely to tilt toward these industries. Indeed, 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) find that managers whose holdings are more 
industry-concentrated perform better. Connections established in one’s previous 
career may facilitate gaining informational advantages in specific firms (Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008 and Tang, 2013). These managers tend to hold less 
diversified portfolios. Skills honed in other career paths may lead to better 
understandings of risk factors, which contribute to better market timing.  
 
Why is our study based on the Chinese mutual fund market? In October 2000, the 
China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued provisional regulations on 
open-end security investment funds. However, the first open-end mutual fund, Hua’an 
Fund, did not appear until September 2001. Since then, the Chinese mutual fund 
industry has undergone a period of rapid growth. The number of funds grew from a 
humble 17 in 2002 to more than 860 operating under 69 fund management companies 
by the end of 2011, with RMB 2.17 trillion under management (all fund types). To 
facilitate the development of the industry, foreign firms are allowed to set up joint 
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venture management companies, which help to popularize standard fund management 
practices.  
  
Figure 1. Total Asset under Management and Number of Funds 
This figure charts total assets under management (AUM) and number of funds of 
actively managed Chinese mutual funds from 2002 to 2011. 
 
Figure 1 charts the total assets under management (AUM) and number of funds of 
actively managed Chinese mutual funds from 2002 to 2011. AUM peaks in 2008, with 
approximately RMB 1.7 trillion, and tapers off after suffering a decline in 2009 
following the Global Financial Crisis. However, the total number of funds continues 
to rise. It increases from 7 in 2002 to 369 in 2011. 
 
This rapid expansion poses a challenge to fund management companies in finding 
qualified fund managers. They do not have the luxury of bringing managers slowly up 
the research analyst ladder. Investment managers and traders are hired from trust 
companies, investment companies, and brokerage firms. Because many fund 
management companies are set up partly by trust and brokerage companies, managers 
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in these companies who have an investment background seem to be a good fit. Of 
course, there are differences between being a mutual fund manager and managing 
assets elsewhere. Fund management is more transparent and faces additional liquidity 
risk concerning money inflows and outflows, more regulatory constraints, and more 
peer pressure. Analysts are hired from the research departments of financial firms. 
Some are hired from banking or the government. To be sure, many undergo an 
internal training process by serving as a research analyst or assistant manager even if 
they have previous experience. However, due to the high demand, the process is 
typically shorter. 
 
Therefore, we address the research questions using data on Chinese mutual funds. The 
fund industry in China has undergone rapid expansion since 2002. As a result, mutual 
funds in China do not always have the luxury of nurturing their own talent through 
in-house training and laddering. Whereas the typical career path of a mutual fund 
manager in the U.S. starts from the junior research analyst position following the 
attainment of an MBA or CFA, Chinese funds find asset management talent from a 
variety of backgrounds. The most significant career position of a Chinese fund 
manager prior to his/her fund managing career could be as diverse as, for example, a 
divisional manager of a bank or a government official with the securities regulatory 
body. Chinese mutual fund data also do not present survivorship bias because none of 
the funds in our sample cease operation. 
 
1.3 Empirical Contribution 
This thesis makes a number of contributions. First, we document how Chinese fund 
managers’ prior career paths affect their managerial performance in Chapter 2. Based 
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on the Chinese mutual fund market, we find that fund performance differs across 
previous work experiences. Fund managers with banking as their primary career 
background significantly underperform on all performance measures, while managers 
with a government background exhibit the best risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Within 
the three better-performing groups, government and research (two groups whose 
career paths seem likely to accumulate information advantages), improve their relative 
performance ranking once risk factors are controlled for, while the better performance 
of managers with an investment background largely disappears. These return 
differences are robust to controlling for fund characteristics such as fund size, fund 
age and expense ratios and manager characteristics such as manager age, tenure, and 
education. By distinguishing individual career backgrounds in a multiple-background 
career path, we can view the overall effect of a career path as the cumulative effect of 
each career segment. This approach leads us to similar findings regarding 
performance differences, confirming that our findings are not driven by the specific 
decision to classify primary career backgrounds.  
 
Then, in Chapter 3, we further investigate how the prior career paths of Chinese fund 
managers affect their management styles. We find consistent patterns regardless of 
whether we group fund managers according to their primary or individual career 
backgrounds. Benchmarking against managers with a banking background, we find 
that managers with an investment background take significantly more market return 
risks and are inclined to adopt a momentum strategy, while managers with a research 
or, especially, a government background take on significantly less market risk. We 
also observe superior stock picking and market timing of managers with research and 
government backgrounds. These managers may gain an information advantage 
10 
 
through their previous research and political connections. For the banking background 
group, we provide a possible justification by investigating the effect of Chinese fund 
managers’ work experience on mutual fund new money flow growth. Compared to the 
other groups, fund managers with a banking background show a high ability to 
generate new money flow to the funds. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we examine the effects of fund managers’ significant political 
connections on their management, which is consistent with our information advantage 
hypothesis that fund managers with political connections can outperform their 
counterparts who lack such connections and obtain more inside information to 
construct their fund portfolios.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Based on the Chinese mutual fund 
market, Chapter 2 examines the effects of fund managers’ career paths on their 
managed fund performance. Chapter 3 investigates how fund mangers’ career paths 
affect their management styles according to holding-based data. Chapter 4 explores 
how the significant political connections that some fund managers have affected their 
fund performance and management styles. The final chapter concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Fund Performance and Managers’ Career Paths 
2.1 Introduction 
How do fund managers’ career paths affect the performance of their funds? Human 
capital in management is one of the key factors by which enterprises obtain and 
maintain competitive advantage (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). There is a substantial 
literature linking fund performance with fund manager characteristics, and prior 
research suggests that fund managers’ education enhances their performance. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the educational background of mutual fund 
managers and find that managers who attended higher mean SAT undergraduate 
institutions achieve systematically higher risk-adjusted excess returns. Recent studies 
consider other managerial characteristics – including sex (Atkinson, Baird, and Frye, 
2003), quality of the MBA program attended (Gottesman and Morey, 2006) and 
tenure (e.g., Martijin, Cremers, and Petaisto, 2009), Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 
2009) – as factors that significantly affect managed fund performance. Another strand 
of the literature examines the effects of managerial characteristics on hedge fund 
performance. For example, Li, Zhang, and Zhao (forthcoming) show that managers 
from higher-SAT institutions tend to generate higher returns and take fewer risks.  
 
Notably, managers do not gain expertise simply by sitting in MBA classes. 
Knowledge and specialties that have accumulated along managers’ career paths 
ultimately contribute to their managerial performance. In practice, work experience is 
substantially emphasized in hiring decisions. However, there is only limited empirical 
evidence that demonstrates the effects of work experience on managerial success. In 
addition, there is also the question of management style. For example, investment 
principles that are advocated in MBA classrooms are more or less the same, but fund 
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managers’ investment styles differ, even within a fund style category. Little is known 
about how work experience shapes manager’s management styles. This paper aims to 
fill this gap in the literature. 
 
In this chapter, we uncover evidence showing how work experience affects 
managerial performance by examining the connection between the work experiences 
of mutual fund managers prior to their fund management career and their subsequent 
fund management performance. The mutual fund context is a good setting in which to 
test the effects of work experience on managerial performance. Because the fund 
manager is the most important factor in fund management, manager performance can 
be measured relatively easily and can be attributed to individual characteristics 
relatively cleanly. Studying fund managers can also provide some insight into how the 
effects of work experience on management style and managerial performance are 
inter-correlated. Fund managers use their “edge”, such as geographic proximity, in 
seeking abnormal returns (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). Moreover, years spent in a 
research department can result in managers’ greater understanding of specific 
industries. Fund managers’ portfolios are likely to tilt toward these industries in which 
they have experience. Indeed, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) find that 
managers whose holdings are more industry-concentrated perform better. Connections 
established in a previous career may help managers gain information advantages in 
specific firms (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008 and Tang, 2013)), and these 
managers tend to hold a less diversified portfolio. Skills that are honed in other career 
paths may also lead to better understandings of risk factors, which contribute to better 
market timing. 
13 
 
We address our research questions using data on Chinese mutual funds, which offer 
us several advantages. The mutual fund industry in China has undergone a rapid 
expansion period since 2003. As a result, Chinese mutual funds do not always have 
the luxury of nurturing their own talent through in-house training and laddering. 
Whereas the typical career path of a mutual fund manager in the U.S. begins at junior 
research analyst after earning an MBA or CFA, Chinese funds find asset management 
talent from a variety of backgrounds. Chinese fund managers’ most significant career 
position prior to their fund managing career might be as a divisional manager of a 
bank, for example, or as a government official with a securities regulatory body. 
Chinese mutual fund data also do not suffer from survivorship bias because no fund in 
our sample has ceased operations. 
 
Using a sample of Chinese fund managers, we manually classify each segment of a 
manager’s entire career path into four categories: government, investment, research, 
and banking. We then examine the impact on fund performance and investment style 
of the primary career background, which is defined by the level of the position held 
and the manager’s tenure, and of career backgrounds that involve a multiple-career 
path. 
 
Following the Fama-Macbeth regression approach, we find that fund performance 
differs across work experiences. First, fund managers with banking as their primary 
career background significantly underperform on all performance measures, whereas 
managers with a government background exhibit the best risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns. Second, among the three top-performing groups, the government and research 
groups (two groups whose career paths seem likely to accumulate information 
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advantages) improve their relative performance standing once risk factors are 
controlled for, whereas the outperformance of managers with an investment 
background largely disappears. These return differences are robust to controlling for 
fund characteristics, including fund size, fund age and expense ratios, and manager 
characteristics, including manager age, tenure, and education. Third, separating out 
individual career backgrounds in a multiple-background career path, we can assess the 
overall effect of a career path as the cumulative effect of each career segment. This 
approach leads us to similar findings regarding performance differences and confirms 
that our findings are not subject to the particularity of classifying primary career 
backgrounds. Finally, as a robustness check, we employ different approaches to test 
the effects of career paths on managed fund performance, including the rolling 
estimation regression approach and the fixed effects panel model approach. We also 
implement different definitions of career paths. Overall, the results are qualitatively 
the same. 
 
Our paper belongs to the broad literature on the effects of fund manager 
characteristics. There is a substantial literature linking fund performance with fund 
manager characteristics. However, most of the current mutual fund research focuses 
on manager characteristics related to education, and the effects of career path have not 
been studied. To our knowledge, we are the first to study the effects of career path on 
fund management; hence, our study fills this gap in the literature.  
 
Under the broad debate of whether mutual fund managers have stock-picking abilities, 
an expanding literature searches for the sources of managers’ information advantage. 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual fund managers tilt holdings toward 
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nearby companies, on which they also earn a higher return, suggesting that geographic 
proximity is a source of information advantage. Similarly, Christoffersen and 
Sarkissian (2009) associate skill with city size and find that funds that are run by 
experienced managers and located in financial centers perform better. Nanda, Wang, 
and Zheng (2004) document that fund families following more focused investment 
strategies across funds perform better, likely because of their informational 
advantages. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) and Tang (2013) suggest industry knowledge as 
a source. Cohen et al. (2008) suggest that shared education networks between fund 
managers and board members act as an information channel. Our study adds to the 
list, as it points to career experience as another channel of information advantage. 
 
Another strand in the literature, mostly in corporate finance, studies the connection 
between managers’ employment experience, life experience in general, and 
management styles. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) find that CEOs who grew up 
during the Great Depression lean excessively on internal finance and that CEOs with 
military experience pursue more aggressive leverage policies. Schoar and Zuo (2011) 
examine how early career experiences affect a manager’s career path. Similar to our 
paper, Dittmar and Duchin (2013) focus on the role of employment experience and 
find that CEOs’ prior employment experience affects corporate financial and 
corporate savings decisions. Our paper differs from these studies because these 
studies mostly document the effects of life experience on managerial styles, whereas 
we directly study the effects of work experience on managerial experiences. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 presents the empirical analyses. 
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Section 2.5 provides robustness checks of our findings using alternative definitions of 
career background and an alternative estimation method. The last section concludes 
this chapter.  
 
2.2 Background and Literature Review 
2.2.1 Background 
In October 2000, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued 
provisional regulations for open-end security investment funds. However, the first 
open-end mutual fund, Hua’an Fund, did not appear until September 2001. Since that 
time, the Chinese mutual fund industry has undergone a period of rapid growth. The 
number of funds grew from a humble 17 in 2002 to more than 860 funds under 69 
fund management companies by the end of 2011, at which point there RMB2.17 
trillion was under management (all fund types). To facilitate the development of the 
industry, foreign firms are allowed to set up joint venture management companies, 
which helped popularize standard fund management practices.  
 
This rapid expansion poses a challenge for fund management companies in terms of 
finding qualified fund managers. These companies do not have the luxury of bringing 
managers slowly up the research analyst ladder. Investment managers and traders are 
hired from trust companies, investment companies, and brokerage firms. Because 
many fund management companies are set up (at least in part) by trust and brokerage 
companies, managers with an investment background seem to be a good fit. Of 
course, there are differences between managing mutual funds and managing other 
types of assets. Fund management is more transparent and faces additional liquidity 
risks with respect to money inflows and outflows, more regulatory constraints, and 
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more peer pressure. Analysts are hired from the research departments of financial 
firms or from the banking or government sectors. Even if they have previous 
experience, many undergo an internal training process as a research analyst or 
assistant manager. However, due to high demand, the process is typically short. 
 
2.2.2 Related Literature Review 
Golec (1996) is an early study of personal qualities in relation to fund manager 
performance; this author explores the relationship between fund managers’ 
educational backgrounds and fund performance. After adjusting for risk, younger fund 
managers with longer work tenure and an MBA degree tend to show better 
performance. Golec (1996) concludes that the work tenure of fund managers has the 
greatest effect on fund performance. Following Golec (1996),  Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999) select the age, whether the manager has an MBA, work tenure and graduate 
schools of fund managers as the independent variables of regressions and select fund 
performance and fund management styles (fund characteristics) as the dependent 
variables. Their results show that funds managed by managers who graduated from 
high-ranking schools outperform those managed by managers who graduated from 
less exclusive schools. Their results diverge from Golec (1996) in that they find that 
whether fund managers have earned an MBA degree has no significant effect on their 
performance. In addition, Gottesman and Morey (2006) extend Chevalier and Elison 
(1999) and measure the quality of the schools where fund managers obtained their 
MBA degree based on GMAT scores and school rankings. They use the average 
monthly raw return, CAPM model α , and the four-factor model α  as fund 
performance indicators. Their results show that managers who graduated from better 
schools exhibit better performance than those from other schools. Meanwhile, the 
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authors also find that whether a fund manager without an MBA has a CFA certificate 
or a doctorate degree has almost no effect on fund performance, whereas veteran fund 
managers show better performance than those with no experience. 
 
Atkinson, Baird and Frye (2003) show that male- and female-managed funds do not 
differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, or other fund characteristics. In 
addition, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that fund managers with greater work 
experience outperform other fund managers, which is consistent with previous studies 
that document a significant relationship between the work experience of fund 
managers and managed fund performance. These authors also show that Morningstar 
ranking and the current net asset values of those funds are higher for more 
experienced managers. A possible explanation for this result is that fund managers 
with longer work tenure have sufficient time to continuously develop and implement 
their portfolio strategy.  
 
In addition, Kihn (1996) finds that the average work tenure of American equity fund 
managers is 5 years. Gottesman and More (2006) show that veteran fund managers 
display better performance than those with no experience. Similar to Kihn (1996), 
Ding and Wermers (2006) find that fund managers have managed a fund for 4.9 years, 
on average, during from 1985 to 2000. Therefore, it has been shown that managers 
with longer work tenure and richer experience have better performance. In a study of 
Australian funds, Gallagher (2003) shows that the academic requirements for fund 
managers in Australia are generally low. Specifically, the Australian fund managers 
with a master’s degree hold only 15% of the fund market have managers with a 
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master’s degree and only 3.3% of the market have managers with a doctorate degree, 
which means that the remaining managers have an undergraduate education or less.  
 
Gallo and Lockwood (1999) find that there is no significant change in timing abilities 
after fund managers are replaced. However, investment styles significantly change 
after managerial replacement announcements. Importantly, Li, Zhang and Zhao 
(2008) use the Fama-Macbeth method to research the impact of hedge fund managers’ 
characteristics, such as education and career concern, on hedge fund performance. 
These authors document that managers from higher-SAT undergraduate institutions 
tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, have more inflow, and take fewer 
risks. 
 
There are few studies on the personal characteristics of equity fund managers in the 
Chinese open mutual fund market. Specifically, Xu and Li (2005) find that there is no 
evidence that fund managers with an MBA outperform those without an MBA. In 
addition, they show that there is a negative relationship between fund managers’ age, 
work tenure and performance. A possible explanation for this finding is that Chinese 
fund managers focus on short-term investing benefits. Moreover, under pressure from 
the required fund performance and to keep their management jobs, new and young 
fund managers tend to create higher risk portfolios to achieve higher performance. 
However, fund managers with longer work tenure tend to be conservative and prefer 
to take relatively prudent investment strategies to avoid volatile fund performance. 
Therefore, their average performance may be worse than that of new fund managers.  
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Moreover, Peng and Li (2005) find that there is no significant relationship between 
managers’ work tenure, joint management and fund performance. In addition, fund 
managers with more experience in fund management outperform those with less 
experience. In a related study, Shen and Huang (2001) analyze the performance of 
Chinese funds using a risk-adjustment index model, T-M model and H-M model and 
show that good fund performance is achieved through fund managers’ stock-picking 
abilities. 
 
Prior research focuses on the personal qualities of fund managers rather than whether 
specific life experiences related to career paths matter. Regarding corporate finance, 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) note that life experiences are likely to shape the 
beliefs and choices of companies’ CEOs later in their life. Similarly, Dittmar and 
Duchin (2013) find that CEOs’ prior employment experience at firms affects 
corporate financial decisions and corporate savings decisions. To date, there are few 
papers on whether fund managers’ specific life experiences that are related to career 
paths matter. Therefore, we extend the literature by focusing on the effects of fund 
managers’ career paths – as measured by their past work experiences – on fund 
performance. 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
We focus on actively managed Chinese domestic open-ended equity mutual funds.2 
Our main sample is created by merging fund data from the Wind Database3 with the 
                                                          
2 We select the “equity” and “equity-majority” fund types. We then eliminate index 
funds and international funds from the sample. In addition, we exclude observations 
from funds with less than one year of history. 
3 http://www.wind.com.cn/ 
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Tianxiang Database4 and the CSMAR Database. The Wind Mutual Fund Database 
provides information about fund returns and other fund characteristics. We use 
monthly return data for our performance and style analysis. Information on mutual 
fund holdings is derived from the Tianxiang Database, and the holdings information is 
only available on a semi-annual basis due to reporting requirements. Our stock and 
market returns data come from the CSMAR Database. Our main sample data span 
from January 2002 to December 2011. Our sample with stock holdings data begins in 
January 2005, when such information was first available. To limit the effect of 
possible data error and extreme values, we further delete the observations with raw 
returns in the top and bottom 1% of the sample. As described in TABLE 2.1, our final 
sample includes 369 open-ended equity funds and 542 fund managers in 48 fund 
families.  
 
2.3.1 Measuring Managers’ Career Paths 
Using a sample of Chinese fund managers, we manually classify each segment of a 
manager’s entire career path into four categories: government, investment, research, 
and banking. We then examine the impact on fund performance and investment style 
of the primary career background, which is defined by the level of the position and the 
manager’s tenure, and of career backgrounds that involve a multiple-career path. 
 
A crucial component of our data consists of information on fund managers’ career 
paths leading up to their current positions. We begin with fund manager biographies 
available in the Wind Database and the Tianxiang Database and supplement them 
with information from the Internet using an extensive search procedure. We then 
                                                          
4 http://www.txsec.com.cn/ 
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manually assign each segment of a fund manager’s prior career into different 
categories. A fund manager in our sample may have one or several of the four distinct 
work experiences in her resume: (1) She may have worked in an administrative staff 
position or as an official for the government, in which case we assign a categorical ID 
of Government; (2) she may have worked as a staff or manager for a commercial bank 
(Banking); (3) she may have worked as a trader or investment manager for the 
proprietary trading arm of brokerage firms or other investment companies 
(Investment); or (4) she may have worked as a research analyst or research manager 
of either buy-side or sell-side firms (Research). Dummy variables are then created for 
each distinct categorical ID in a manager’s career path. The number of paths in each 
category is presented in Table 2.1 The majority of the managers, 472 out of 542, have 
multiple work experiences. For managers with multiple prior work experiences along 
their career paths, we are also interested in the effect of their primary career 
background on fund management. To classify each manager’s career into a unique 
career background, we use a “career scoring system” that combines career position 
with the manager’s tenure in that position. Specifically, we assign a position score of 
1-4 to each career position according to the level of the position on the career ladder 
within each of the four work experiences discussed above. For each manager, we then 
calculate a categorical ID score as follows, 
Categorical ID Scorej = ∑ Position Scorej,k
Tenurej,k
Total Tenure
4
k=1 , 
 
where Position Scorej,k is the score of career position k in work experience j, 
Tenurej,k is the number of years a manager spent in position k of experience j, and 
Total Tenure is the total number of years of prior work experiences that a fund 
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manager has. We then assign the categorical ID of the highest score as each 
manager’s primary career background.5 
 
For example, a person who worked two years as a project manager and one year as a 
sub-branch general manager at the China Merchants Bank, one year as an analyst at 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, and one year as an investment manager at China CITIC 
has a categorical ID score of 2*(2/5) + 3*(1/5) = 1.4 for Banking, 1*(1/5) = 0.2 for 
Research, and 2*(1/5) = 0.4 for Investment, and her primary career background is 
designated as Banking. Appendix presents a detailed description of the score 
assignment and the “Career Scoring System”. 
 
TABLE 2.1 provides the summary statistics for the career backgrounds of the 
managers in our sample. Of the 542 fund managers, 42 have a primary career 
background that is classified with the categorical ID of Government, 36 classified as 
Banking, 221 as Investment, and 243 as Research. 
 
  
                                                          
5 Dividing the score by total tenure has no effect on assigning categorical IDs because 
each person has one (same) total tenure. It does make a difference when we use 
categorical ID scores of each individual career in regressions of potential multiple 
careers in TABLE 2.10. 
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TABLE 2.1: Summary Statistics for Fund and Manager Characteristics 
This table summarises the statistics for the sample of actively managed Chinese 
equity mutual funds. For dummy variables, the first column (#) reports the number of 
observations for which the dummy variable equals one. 
 
 
# Min Median Mean S.D. Max 
Number of fund-month obs. 10,264      
Number of funds  369      
Number of fund managers 542      
Fund Characteristics 
Raw Ret (%)  -30.28 1.88 1.42 0.08 25.78 
Excess Ret (%)  -23.90 0.20 0.30 0.04 29.32 
CAPM Ab. Ret (%)  -52.10 0.30 0.27 0.04 28.33 
Four-Factor Ab. Ret (%)  -51.24 0.53 0.52 0.04 28.96 
Fund age  1.32 5.30 4.96 2.18 10.60 
Log (TNA) (Million Yuan)  1.72 3.41 3.33 0.61 4.52 
Expense ratio (%)  0.00 0.13 0.16 0.01 1.14 
Joint management  4,847 0.00  0.47  1.00 
Managerial replacement  2,722 0.00  0.27  1.00 
Primary Career Background 
Government 42 0.00  0.08  1.00 
Banking 36 0.00  0.07  1.00 
Investment 221 0.00  0.41  1.00 
Research 243 0.00  0.44  1.00 
Multiple Career Background 
Government  58 0.00  0.11  1.00 
Banking  63 0.00  0.12  1.00 
Investment  369 0.00  0.68  1.00 
Research 384 0.00  0.71  1.00 
Other Manager Characteristics 
Political connection 162 0.00  0.30  1.00 
Sex  428 0.00  0.79  1.00 
Postgraduate degree  515 0.00  0.95  1.00 
Overseas experience  76 0.00  0.14  1.00 
Fund manager tenure  1.00 3.00 2.66 1.13 8.00 
Fund manager age  27.00 36.00 36.66 3.91 52.00 
# of FUM    1.00 3.00 3.00 1.52 7.00 
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2.3.2 Measuring Fund Performance 
We use several measures of fund performance. Raw return is computed as the relative 
change in net asset value including dividend distributions, which is therefore net of 
management fees and other expenses that managers subtract from assets under 
management.  
Raw Reti,t =
NAVi,t − NAVi,t−1 + Di,t
NAVi,t−1
 
 
where i is the index for fund, t is the index for data period, Raw Reti,t is the raw return 
of fund i at time t, NAVi,t is an indicator of net asset value of fund i at time t, and Di,t is 
the dividend of fund i at time t. 
 
Then, we define excess return as fund raw return net of the benchmark return of its 
corresponding style. Benchmarks of Chinese equity mutual funds are self-reported 
and include the three categories of growth, value, and balanced.  
Excess Reti,t = Raw Reti,t − Raverage of same fund style,i,t 
 
where Excess Reti,t is the excess return of fund i at time t, Raw Reti,t is the raw return 
of fund i at time t and Raverage of same fund style,i,t is the average return of the same 
fund style as the benchmark return at time t. 
 
In addition, we estimate abnormal returns after adjusting for the factor loadings using 
the one-factor capital asset pricing model (CAPM). We calculate the alpha of each 
mutual equity fund-month in our sample by regressing the fund’s monthly return in 
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that year minus the risk-free rate on the monthly return of the market minus the 
risk-free rate. 
Raw Reti,t − rft = αi + βi(MarketRt − rft) + εi,t 
CAPM Ab. Reti,t = αi + εi,t 
 
where Raw 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  is the raw return of fund i at time t, rft is the risk-free rate, 
MarketRt is the market portfolio return at time t, and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 𝐴𝑏.  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the market 
risk-adjusted return, which is collected from the CAPM regression. 
 
Moreover, we introduce fund return adjusted by the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model augmented with a factor that reflects the momentum effect from 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). This four-factor model controls for risk and style 
factors and has thus been shown in various contexts to provide explanatory power for 
the observed cross-sectional variation in the performance of equity funds (Carhart, 
1997). Following Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), we compute the risk-adjusted 
return as follows. 
Raw Reti,t − rft
= αi + βi,M(MarketRt − rft)
+ βi,SMBSMBt + βi,HMLHMLt + βi,MOMMOMt + εi,t 
Four − Factor Ab.  Reti,t = αi + εi,t 
 
where Raw 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the raw return of fund i at time t, rft is the risk-free rate, 
MarketRt is the market rate at time t and 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑟 − 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑏.  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 t is the 
four-factor adjusted return, which is the abnormal return obtained from the Carhart 
model. In addition, this computation introduces the independent variables given by the 
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returns of four zero-investment factor portfolios. The expression MarketRt - rft denotes 
the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate. SMBt is the return 
difference between small and large capitalization stocks, HMLt is the return difference 
between high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOMt is the return difference 
between stocks with high and low past returns. 
 
TABLE 2.1 provides the summary statistics for the fund characteristics in our sample. 
The results show that the mutual funds in our sample exhibit large variation in terms 
of performance. Raw monthly returns, for example, have a low variation of -30.28% 
and a high variation of 25.78%, with a mean of 1.42%. 
 
2.3.3 Other Fund and Manger Characteristics 
Previous studies suggest that fund characteristics such as fund age (Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1997), fund size (Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004), and expense ratios 
(e.g., Carhart, 1997) help predict fund performance. We control for these fund 
characteristics in our analysis. The average age of all funds is approximately 5 years, 
and the average fund size, as measured in logarithm (10 based) of TNA (in million 
Yuan), is 3.33. Moreover, the mean expense ratio is approximately 0.16% per month, 
which translates to an annual rate of 1.92% (see Table 2.1). This result is consistent 
with other studies of Chinese equity funds. 
 
TABLE 2.1 also reports the summary statistics for other manager characteristics that 
we use as control variables. Of the Chinese mutual fund managers in our sample, 79% 
are male (Sex equals one), 95% have a postgraduate degree, and 14% have overseas 
study or work experiences. Average fund manager tenure is less than 3 years, which is 
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approximately a year shorter than the average tenure of American fund managers, 
according to Chevalier and Ellison (1999). Many managers manage multiple funds; 
the average number of funds managed by a manager is three. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we examine the relationship between fund performance and fund 
managers’ work experience. We begin with univariate statistics between fund 
performance and managers’ primary career background. We then run a regression 
analysis of the effect of career path – both primary career background and each work 
experience – on different measures of fund performance while controlling for other 
fund and manager characteristics. 
 
2.4.1 Univariate Evidence 
TABLE 2.2 presents the mean performance measures according to each fund 
manager’s primary career background. Our first observation of Panel A of the table is 
that Chinese mutual fund managers seem to earn abnormal returns on average except 
for the managers whose primary career background is banking. Risk-adjusted returns 
for managers with government, investment, and research backgrounds are all 
significantly positive. Managers with a primary background in government show the 
highest performance on all measures except for excess return (0.29%), in which they 
are second to managers with a research background (0.34%). These observations are 
further confirmed by the results presented in Panel B, which are the results of pairwise 
T-tests of performance between managers with different career backgrounds. 
Performance differences between the Banking group and the other three groups are 
always positive, and they are significant at the 10% level at least (lowest t-statistic is 
29 
 
1.78). For example, the differences in the four-factor abnormal returns range from 
0.37% to 0.45%, which translate into annual differences of 4.44% to 5.4%. 
Interestingly, the Government group also outperforms the Investment and Research 
groups in terms of CAPM abnormal returns, although the difference is only weakly 
significant. 
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TABLE 2.2: Univariate Analysis of Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths 
This table reports univariate statistics of fund performance measures for managers 
grouped by primary career background. Panel A reports the mean performance 
measures. Panel B reports the pair-wise performance difference between groups. The 
returns are expressed in percentage per month. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Panel A: Mean performance measures 
Government 
1.29*** 0.29 0.34*** 0.59*** 
(2.78) (1.54) (2.84) (4.02) 
Investment 
1.12*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.51*** 
(4.42) (3.21) (3.26) (6.24) 
Research 
1.16*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.56*** 
(5.31) (4.35) (3.63) (5.78) 
Banking 
0.64** -0.01 -0.04 0.14 
(2.33) (-0.11) (-0.42) (0.32) 
Panel B: Pairwise T-test 
Government-Investment 
0.17 0.02 0.09* 0.08 
(1.04) (0.88) (1.98) (1.23) 
Government-Research 
0.13 -0.05 0.08* 0.03 
(0.87) (-1.27) (1.83) (0.14) 
Government-Banking 
0.65* 0.30* 0.38** 0.45* 
(1.95) (1.82) (2.02) (1.78) 
Investment-Research 
-0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 
(-0.22) (-1.44) (-0.32) (-0.25) 
Investment-Banking 
0.76** 0.28* 0.29** 0.37* 
(2.05) (1.84) (2.16) (1.79) 
Research-Banking 
0.97** 0.35** 0.30** 0.42** 
(2.05) (2.10) (2.16) (2.16) 
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2.4.2 Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Fama-Macbeth Regression  
Our univariate evidence on primary career backgrounds that is shown above is 
suggestive. However, performance differences in career paths may be correlated with 
other fund and manager characteristics. In this section, we examine the extent to 
which performance differences between managers of different career backgrounds 
persist when we control for differences in fund and other manager characteristics. 
Moreover, because a manager may have multiple career backgrounds, we estimate the 
impact of each type of career background separately. To that end, we follow Li et al. 
(forthcoming) and employ a Fama-Macbeth regression approach. For each month, we 
run a cross-sectional regression of fund performance on manager career-path 
characteristics while controlling for fund and other manager characteristics. Thus, we 
run 
Performancei,j,t
= δ0,t + γ1,tCareer Dummiesj + γ2,tFund Characteristicsi,t
+ γ3,tOther Manager Characteristicsj,t + εi,j,t 
 
where γs are vectors of coefficient estimates for each month t. We take care to use 
only return data that are specific to manager j in calculating 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡. We 
then report the estimated mean and t-statistics of these coefficients. We use this 
approach to estimate the effect of both primary career background and individual 
career background in (potentially) multi-career paths. For primary career background, 
we include dummy variables for each of the categories of Government, Investment, 
and Research; the omitted category is Banking. For individual career background, we 
include dummy variables for each of the four categories. Fund managers in our 
sample have different combinations of career backgrounds, and the number of distinct 
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backgrounds also varies. In other words, individual career dummies are not 
constrained to perfect multicollinearity, which facilitates the identification of the 
effects of each individual career background on fund performance, and the sum of the 
coefficient estimates for all career backgrounds that a manager has had yields the total 
effect of the manager’s career path on performance. 
 
TABLE 2.3 reports the results. Panel A shows the mean estimates and the 
corresponding t-statistics in regressions using primary career background to create 
career background dummies. Panel B shows the results for individual career 
background. The results in Panel A largely confirm our univariate analysis findings. 
Point estimates of career dummies for all performance measures are all positive and 
are significant at least at the 10% level except for two instances, indicating that 
managers with Government, Investment, and Research primary backgrounds 
outperform those with a Banking background. One exception is the coefficient 
estimate on the Research dummy, which equals 0.14 and is not significant (t = 1.36), 
with excess return as the performance measure, which contrasts with the univariate 
result that the Research group has the highest excess return among all managers. The 
difference is likely caused by the correlation between excess returns of the Research 
group and other fund and manager characteristics. The Government group continues 
to have the highest performance on factor-adjusted abnormal returns but no longer has 
the best performance in terms of raw or excess returns.  
 
The coefficient estimates for individual career background in career paths, in Panel B, 
yield similar results. The coefficient estimates for government, investment, and 
research backgrounds are all positive. The Government dummies in these regressions 
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always have the highest estimates among all career backgrounds. Governmental work 
experience in a manager’s career is thus always the most beneficial to her fund 
managing performance, even when government work experience as the primary career 
background does not result in the best performance on some measures. Estimates on 
Research are also all significant, although the excess return and CAPM estimates of 
Investment become nonsignificant. Perhaps (and not too surprisingly), estimates of 
individual background in banking are negative and significant when raw return and 
four-factor return are used as performance measures. The implication is not only that 
managers with a primary banking background perform the worst but also that having 
any banking experience is detrimental to a manager’s later fund management 
performance. 
 
Coefficient estimates in Panel B also allow us to answer the interesting question of 
whether having multiple career backgrounds is good for a Chinese fund manager’s 
later fund management performance. The answer is yes, except for experiences in the 
banking industry, which simply follows because the total effect of a manager’s career 
path is the sum of all the coefficients of the categorical dummies in which she has 
experience. 
 
Another observation that we make based on TABLE 2.3 is that risk adjustment is 
critically important to relative performance among the three higher-performing 
groups. In Panel A, the point estimate for the Government dummy increases from 
0.29 (with weak significance) in a raw return regression to 0.56 in the CAPM 
abnormal returns regression and to 0.81 (and 5% significance) in the four-factor 
abnormal returns regression. Similarly, in Panel B, it increases from 0.45 to 0.72 and 
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then to 0.86 and is highly significant. Risk-adjusted abnormal returns can be 
characterized as the stock-picking ability of a manager that is independent of her 
choice of factor loadings. Career background in government has a larger effect on 
manager stock-picking abilities. The comparison between Investment and Research, 
whose estimates in raw return regressions are not particularly different, is also 
interesting. The coefficient estimate of Investment decreases as we adjust for more 
risk factors in performance measures, whereas that of Research increases. As a result, 
adjusting for Carhart (1997) factors, Research has a much larger effect on 
performance than Investment. This finding suggests that managers with an investment 
background rely more on choosing factor weights to generate returns, whereas 
managers with a research background rely more on picking stocks.  
 
We now turn to the regression results for the control variables. Consistent with the 
substantial literature on U.S. mutual funds6, we find that higher expense is negatively 
correlated with fund performance. The coefficient estimates on expense ratio are 
negative and highly significant across all regressions. Contrary to the evidence 
regarding U.S. mutual funds,7 we find that fund size is positively correlated with fund 
performance, although the significance is limited to regressions of individual career 
background. This finding, however, is consistent with evidence for non-U.S. mutual 
funds (Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos, 2013) and for Chinese mutual funds in 
particular (Tang, Wang, and Xu, 2012). Ferreira et al. (2013) study determinants of 
mutual fund performance in 27 countries and find that the U.S. evidence of adverse 
scale effect is an exception rather than the rule. With respect to other fund 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Carhart (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Wermers (2000) 
among others. 
7 See Chen et al. (2004), Berk and Green (2004), and Pollet and Wilson (2008) for 
studies on fund size and performance. 
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characteristics, we find no evidence that fund age is correlated with fund performance, 
which is not surprising given the relatively short history of Chinese funds. There is 
some evidence that jointly managed funds perform worse, but these estimates are 
mostly nonsignificant. Funds seem to perform better in the initial three-month period 
following managerial replacement. 
 
Some other manager characteristics seem to affect performance. Fund performance 
decreases with manager tenure. Notably, female managers perform better than their 
male counterparts. In the world of the male-dominated Chinese mutual fund industry, 
a female manager must have extraordinary abilities to survive. There is some evidence 
that managers who have postgraduate degrees outperform those who do not, but there 
is no evidence that overseas experience leads to better fund management abilities. 
Multiple funds under management seem to distract managers, and this result is 
significant in some regressions. However, manager age does not seem to matter. 
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TABLE 2.3: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Fama-Macbeth Regression Approach 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund performances on career background dummies, 
fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to the fund 
manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, we create multiple career background dummies for each individual career background 
in a manager’s career path. Regressions are carried out for each month, and mean coefficient estimates are reported. The returns are 
presented as percentages. The t-statistics use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are presented in parentheses. Time series averages 
of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career Background 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM 
Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret  
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Government 
0.29* 0.21* 0.56** 0.81** 
 
0.45*** 0.64* 0.72*** 0.86*** 
(1.86) (1.71) (2.06) (2.02) 
 
(2.73) (1.74) (2.92) (3.08) 
Investment 
0.36** 0.37* 0.28* 0.26 
 
0.30** 0.41 0.10 0.11** 
(2.04) (1.94) (1.81) (1.59) 
 
(2.02) (1.65) (1.65) (2.09) 
Research 
0.34** 0.14 0.27* 0.56** 
 
0.44*** 0.63* 0.68* 0.68*** 
(2.01) (1.36) (1.75) (2.03) 
 
(2.61) (1.72) (1.73) (2.62) 
Banking      
-0.47* -0.33 -0.35 -0.38* 
     
(-1.84) (-1.16) (-0.72) (-1.75) 
Fund age 
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 
(0.17) (0.23) (0.09) (0.21) 
 
(0.64) (0.67) (0.81) (1.01) 
Log (TNA) 
0.27 0.26 0.38* 0.18 
 
0.54** 0.62*** 0.63** 0.57** 
(0.43) (0.48) (1.74) (0.41) 
 
(2.01) (2.59) (2.43) (2.13) 
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Expense ratio 
-6.98*** -6.75** -6.81*** -7.32*** 
 
-6.16*** -7.28*** -5.31*** -5.49*** 
(-2.96) (-2.29) (-2.59) (-2.74) 
 
(-3.28) (-4.02) (-2.85) (-2.96) 
Joint management 
-0.59** -0.26* -0.14 -0.21 
 
-0.14 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 
(-2.23) (-1.72) (-0.43) (-0.72) 
 
(-0.71) (-0.36) (-0.12) (-0.04) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.73* 0.85** 0.62** 0.48* 
 
0.36** 0.15* 0.08 0.17 
(1.94) (2.05) (2.11) (1.83) 
 
(2.23) (1.72) (1.14) (1.57) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.03** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** 
 
-0.07** -0.06* -0.03 -0.02 
(-2.31) (-2.36) (-2.47) (-2.32) 
 
(-2.21) (-1.96) (-1.03) (-1.03) 
Sex 
-0.42 -0.46* -0.69*** -0.50** 
 
-0.38** -0.29** -0.56** -0.60** 
(-1.59) (-1.89) (-2.88) (-2.13) 
 
(-2.32) (-2.06) (-2.01) (-2.14) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.13 0.17* 0.21** 0.23** 
 
0.37* 0.26 0.45* 0.47* 
(1.62) (1.82) (2.14) (2.18) 
 
(1.71) (1.37) (1.72) (1.69) 
Overseas 
experience 
-0.11 -0.13 -0.17 -0.18 
 
-0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 
(-0.43) (-0.64) (-0.62) (-0.74) 
 
(-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.13) (-0.14) 
# of FUM 
-0.04* -0.04 -0.02* -0.02 
 
-0.10** -0.10** -0.26 -0.30 
(-1.71) (-1.42) (-1.77) (-1.41) 
 
(-2.13) (-1.99) (-0.87) (-0.97) 
Fund manager 
age 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 
-0.15 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 
(-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.05) (-0.26) 
 
(-1.17) (-0.74) (-0.52) (-0.61) 
CONSTANT 
-0.16 -0.28 -0.77** -0.69** 
 
-0.48 -0.51 -0.41 -0.62* 
(-0.37) (-1.21) (-2.26) (-1.98)   (-1.61) (-0.84) (-1.40) (-1.71) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
 
10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 7.56% 7.97% 9.89% 10.04%   8.64% 9.59% 10.49% 11.02% 
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2.4.3 Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Rolling Estimation 
Regression  
In this section, an alternative approach, rolling estimation regression, is utilized as a 
robustness check. For a particular fund manager, at the end of the semi-annual SA 
period, the following regression is run using the past 24 monthly returns, 
ri,j,t = αi,j + βi,j,SAXt + ϵi,j,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the excess return of fund i managed by fund manager j over month t, 
βi,j,SA  represents the risk exposures of fund i managed by fund manager j at 
semi-annual SA to the various factors, and Xt is the monthly value of different 
factors in month t. 
 
We then compute Performancei,j,SA  of fund i managed by fund manager j at 
semi-annual SA as, 
Performancei,j,SA = ri,j,SA − βi,j,SAX′SA 
 
where ri,j,SA  is the excess return of fund i managed by fund manager j for 
semi-annual SA, and X′SA is the value of different factors in semi-annual SA. 
 
Because the regression is run semi-annually, we allow Performancei,j,SA and βi,j,SA 
to be time-varying. Performancei,j,SA measures the risk-adjusted return of a fund 
managed by one fund manager, and βi,j,SA measures a the exposures to various risk 
factors of a fund managed by one fund manager. 
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Following the above, we use semi-annual raw return, excess return, CAPM abnormal 
return and four-factor abnormal return as dependent variables in the Fama-Macbeth 
regressions.8  
 
TABLE 2.4 reports the results of the Fama-Macbeth regressions. Panel A shows the 
mean estimates and the corresponding t-statistics in regressions using primary career 
background to create career background dummies. Panel B shows the results using 
individual career background. In Panel A, consistent with the results in TABLE 2.3, 
we find that managers that have Government, Investment, and Research primary 
backgrounds outperform those with a Banking background. As we note in TABLE 
2.3, the coefficient estimate on the Research dummy with four-factor abnormal return 
as the performance measure is not significant. However, in the rolling estimation 
regression, it is significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the univariate 
result that the Research group has the highest excess return among all managers. The 
Government group continues to have the best performance in terms of factor-adjusted 
abnormal returns, but it no longer exhibits the best performance with respect to raw 
returns.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.4 shows that the coefficient estimates for individual career 
background in career paths provide similar results, and the results are consistent with 
those presented in TABLE 2.3. The coefficient estimates for Government, Investment, 
and Research backgrounds are all positive. The Government dummies in these 
regressions always have the highest estimates among all career backgrounds except 
for raw returns. The estimates of the Investment group remain more significant for 
                                                          
8 A Fama-Macbeth regression runs the cross-sectional regression first and then 
reports the average time series results. 
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raw returns; however, the estimates become much weaker for excess returns and 
nonsignificant for factor-adjusted abnormal returns. Estimates of individual 
background in banking remain negative and significant when raw return, CAPM 
abnormal return and four-factor abnormal return are used as performance measures. 
These results confirm the conclusion we drew from TABLE 2.3 that the coefficient 
estimate of an Investment background decreases as we adjust for more risk factors in 
performance measures, whereas the estimates of Government and Research increase. 
This result suggests that managers with an investment background rely more on 
choosing factor weights to generate returns, whereas managers with government and 
research backgrounds rely more on information advantages and picking stocks. 
Overall, rolling estimation regression results continue to suggest that prior career path 
has a significant effect on fund management performance. Furthermore, different 
career paths present different levels of fund performance. 
 
Concerning the control variables, consistent with the results presented in TABLE 2.3, 
we find that higher expense remains significantly negatively correlated with fund 
performance. Contrary to the evidence regarding U.S. mutual funds, we find that fund 
size is positively correlated with fund performance, although the significance is 
limited to regressions of individual career background. In addition, we find no 
evidence that fund age is correlated with fund performance, which may be due to the 
short history of the Chinese funds industry. The results also show that jointly 
managed funds perform worse, but these estimates are mostly nonsignificant. Funds 
seem to perform better in the initial three-month period following managerial 
replacement; however, the result becomes weaker when risk factors are controlled for. 
Concerning other manager characteristics, fund performance is significantly 
41 
 
negatively correlated with manager tenure at least at the 5% level, which is consistent 
with most Chinese mutual fund research that finds that fund managers with long 
manager tenure perform worse. In addition, female managers continue to perform 
better than their male counterparts. In the world of the male-dominated Chinese 
mutual fund industry, a female manager must have extraordinary abilities to survive. 
There is some evidence that managers who have postgraduate degrees outperform 
those who do not but no evidence that overseas experience leads to greater fund 
management abilities. Multiple funds under management seem to distract managers, 
but the result is nonsignificant in the rolling estimation regressions. Furthermore, 
manager age still does not seem to influence fund performance.
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TABLE 2.4: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Rolling Estimation Regression Approach 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the rolling estimation regressions of fund performances on career background 
dummies, fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to the 
fund manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, we create multiple career background dummies for each individual career 
background in a manager’s career path. Regressions are carried out for each semi-annual period, and mean coefficient estimates are 
reported. The returns are presented as percentages. The t-statistics use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are presented in 
parentheses. Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career Background 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM 
Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret  
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Government 
1.74** 1.84** 2.40*** 2.59*** 
 
1.98*** 2.12* 2.37*** 2.70*** 
(2.14) (2.13) (3.01) (3.65) 
 
(2.61) (1.93) (2.95) (3.28) 
Investment 
2.58*** 1.07* 1.41* 1.02 
 
2.24** 1.85 1.51 1.07* 
(2.65) (1.74) (1.78) (1.54) 
 
(2.18) (1.37) (1.08) (1.82) 
Research 
1.53** 1.35** 1.65** 2.11*** 
 
1.59** 1.24** 1.87*** 1.96*** 
(2.22) (2.02) (2.27) (3.13) 
 
(2.35) (2.09) (2.68) (2.81) 
Banking      
-1.21** -1.06 -1.14* -1.22** 
     
(-2.04) (-1.41) (-1.72) (-2.04) 
Fund age 
0.40 0.21 0.35 0.34 
 
0.14 0.18 0.22 0.27 
(0.61) (1.19) (1.39) (1.14) 
 
(0.91) (1.12) (1.30) (1.51) 
Log (TNA) 
0.85 0.97 0.60 0.54 
 
0.87** 0.99*** 0.91** 0.74** 
(0.76) (1.54) (0.75) (0.67) 
 
(2.37) (2.97) (2.25) (2.10) 
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Expense ratio 
-12.15*** -11.55*** -8.42*** -7.73*** 
 
-8.33*** -8.01*** -7.17*** -6.45*** 
(-3.23) (-3.12) (-2.68) (-2.71) 
 
(-4.97) (-4.23) (-3.79) (-3.23) 
Joint management 
1.78** -1.24* -1.02 -1.48** 
 
-1.23 -1.09 -0.83 -0.61 
(1.98) (-1.89) (-1.42) (-2.29) 
 
(-0.94) (-0.80) (-0.41) (-0.29) 
Managerial 
replacement 
1.78* 1.74** 0.87* 0.93 
 
1.13* 1.04 0.77 0.68 
(1.92) (2.01) (1.72) (0.67) 
 
(1.86) (1.53) (1.29) (1.05) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.06* -0.07* -0.07* -0.02 
 
-0.04* -0.03 -0.06* -0.04 
(-1.69) (-1.76) (-1.76) (-0.38) 
 
(-1.69) (-1.44) (-1.68) (-1.62) 
Sex 
-1.16 -0.32 -1.04 -0.82 
 
-0.69* -0.87** -0.43* -0.52** 
(-1.23) (-0.26) (-1.16) (-1.03) 
 
(-1.94) (-2.27) (-1.71) (-2.01) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.29** 0.18* 0.43*** 0.53*** 
 
0.18 0.24 0.30 0.19 
(2.11) (1.84) (2.59) (2.64) 
 
(1.39) (1.53) (1.48) (1.44) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.80 -0.66 -0.28 -0.77 
 
-0.57 -0.41 -0.88 -0.67 
(1.00) (-0.74) (-0.21) (-0.84) 
 
(-0.86) (-0.69) (-1.23) (-0.99) 
# of FUM 
-0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 
 
-0.24 -0.38 -0.35 -0.31 
(-0.23) (-0.11) (-0.36) (-0.21) 
 
(-1.52) (-1.44) (-1.21) (-1.06) 
Fund manager 
age 
-0.05 -0.16 -0.33 -0.28 
 
-0.12 -0.19* -0.08 -0.09 
(-0.23) (-1.03) (-1.21) (-0.99) 
 
(-1.49) (-1.87) (-1.22) (-1.41) 
CONSTANT 
-1.56 -1.39** -2.23 -2.76 
 
-1.33* -1.45 -1.03* -0.86** 
(-1.19) (-2.07) (-1.01) (-1.16)   (-1.72) (-1.39) (-1.93) (-2.12) 
Obs. 2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
 
2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
Adjusted R2 6.75% 7.71% 8.18% 8.72%   7.58% 7.92% 9.04% 9.27% 
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2.4.4 Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Fixed Effects Panel Model  
In this section, we utilize a fixed effects panel model to examine the effects of 
manager career path on fund performance. We examine the effect of work experience 
on fund performance while controlling for fund specific and time series specific 
effects. In this examination, we estimate the following regression, 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑍𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
where 𝛼𝑡  represents a monthly time fixed effect, 𝛾𝑖 are fund fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
represents time-varying fund and manager characteristics, and Zj  are 
manager-specific career background dummies. With the inclusion of both fund and 
time fixed effects, our identification of 𝜆 depends on managers who remain in one 
fund for only a subset of the entire sample period or managers who switch funds 
within the sample period.9 By including the fund fixed effect, we also control for the 
contribution of unobserved fund characteristics to fund performance. 
 
TABLE 2.5 reports the results, which are consistent with those presented in TABLE 
2.3 and TABLE 2.4. Managers with government experience continue to be the 
highest-performing group, followed by managers with a research background, and 
their advantages are more significant after controlling for risk factors. The coefficient 
estimates for Government primary career background (Panel A), for example, 
increase from 0.16 (t = 2.20) for raw returns to 0.54 (t = 2.71) for four-factor adjusted 
abnormal returns. In addition, the estimates for Government individual career 
background remain strongly significant at the 5% level, at least. The coefficient 
                                                          
9 See Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the manager fixed 
effects models. 
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estimates for Research – both for the primary career background and for the 
individual background – are mostly significant and positive, except for excess return 
when considering primary career background and raw return when considering 
individual career background. The evidence that managers with an investment 
background do not outperform after accounting for risk taking is also more 
pronounced in Table 5. Although some of the estimates on Investment using 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns as dependent variables remain weakly significant in 
TABLE 2.3, they are all nonsignificant in TABLE 2.5.  
 
For the control variables, consistent with previous studies, the higher expense ratio 
remains significantly negatively correlated with fund performance. Larger funds also 
perform significantly better than smaller funds. There remains no evidence that older 
funds perform better after controlling for risk factors. However, the result shows that 
jointly managed funds perform significantly worse the fixed effects panel model is 
utilized. Funds seem to obtain higher abnormal returns in the initial three-month 
period following managerial replacement. For other manager characteristics, the 
coefficient estimates for fund manager tenure are no longer significant, although they 
remain negative. In addition, female managers continue to perform better than their 
male counterparts due to their extraordinary ability to survive in the world of the 
male-dominated Chinese mutual fund industry. There is some evidence that managers 
who have a postgraduate degree outperform those who do not, but there is no 
evidence that overseas experience leads to better fund management ability. Multiple 
funds under management seem to distract managers, but the result remains 
nonsignificant in these regressions. However, here, manager age seems to have some 
negative effects on fund performance that are only significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 2.5: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Fixed Effects Panel Model Approach 
This table reports the panel data using fixed effects estimation results of fund performances on career background dummies, fund 
characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to the fund manager’s 
primary career background. In Panel B, we create multiple career background dummies for each individual career background in a 
manager’s career path. Regressions are carried out for each month, and mean coefficient estimates are reported. The returns are presented 
as percentages. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career Background 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM 
Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret  
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Government 
0.16** 0.27* 0.41*** 0.54*** 
 
0.11* 0.17** 0.34** 0.46** 
(2.20) (1.88) (2.59) (2.71) 
 
(1.92) (2.06) (2.49) (2.56) 
Investment 
0.28** 0.24* 0.16 0.11 
 
0.85*** 0.51** 0.26 0.22 
(2.43) (1.69) (1.43) (0.92) 
 
(2.79) (2.27) (1.52) (1.38) 
Research 
0.22** 0.26 0.34* 0.39* 
 
0.16 0.21* 0.28** 0.36** 
(2.28) (1.33) (1.84) (1.94) 
 
(1.65) (1.81) (1.98) (2.17) 
Banking      
-0.64** -0.47* -0.42** -0.29 
     
(-2.36) (-1.92) (-2.11) (-1.48) 
Fund age 
0.04* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 
0.03* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
(1.82) (1.68) (1.37) (1.45) 
 
(1.76) (1.69) (1.42) (1.51) 
Log (TNA) 
0.46** 0.35* 0.31** 0.46** 
 
0.49** 0.34* 0.33** 0.49** 
(2.19) (1.91) (2.02) (2.37) 
 
(2.41) (1.87) (2.13) (2.52) 
Expense ratio 
-5.77*** -3.14** -4.81*** -4.47*** 
 
-5.59*** -3.17** -4.88*** -4.62*** 
(-4.41) (-2.24) (-3.05) (-2.88) 
 
(-4.18) (-2.36) (-3.21) (-3.14) 
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Joint management 
-0.09*** -0.16** -0.06* -0.04* 
 
-0.11** -0.15** -0.06* -0.03* 
(-3.13) (-2.26) (-1.79) (-1.71) 
 
(-3.27) (-2.15) (-1.78) (-1.69) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.12 0.14* 0.35** 0.37** 
 
0.13 0.12 0.28** 0.36** 
(0.99) (1.68) (2.39) (2.46) 
 
(1.06) (1.57) (2.12) (2.41) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(-0.84) (-0.54) (-0.38) (-0.41) 
 
(-0.60) (-0.52) (-0.34) (-0.42) 
Sex 
-0.02* -0.04* -0.06* -0.04* 
 
-0.03* -0.04* -0.05* -0.04* 
(-1.75) (-1.92) (-1.92) (-1.74) 
 
(-1.84) (-1.95) (-1.86) (-1.77) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
-0.31* -0.27* -0.54** -0.66** 
 
-0.26 -0.25* -0.49* -0.61** 
(-1.81) (-1.92) (-2.09) (-2.15) 
 
(-1.63) (-1.84) (-1.94) (-2.02) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.06** 0.09* 0.14* 0.16** 
 
0.05** 0.07 0.13 0.17** 
(2.41) (1.77) (1.68) (2.08) 
 
(2.28) (1.54) (1.41) (2.14) 
# of FUM 
-0.12 -0.16 -0.06 -0.08 
 
-0.11 -0.15 -0.09 -0.07 
(-0.46) (-0.72) (-0.21) (-0.81) 
 
(-0.52) (-0.68) (-0.54) (-0.73) 
Fund manager age 
-0.15 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 
 
-0.18 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 
(-0.60) (-1.19) (-0.75) (-0.50) 
 
(-1.03) (-1.10) (-0.79) (-0.55) 
CONSTANT 
-0.48 -0.32 -0.53 -0.29* 
 
-0.54** -0.44* -0.29 -0.38* 
(-1.44) (-1.18) (-0.97) (-1.83)   (-2.18) (-1.91) (-1.48) (-1.87) 
Fund fixed effect  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Month fixed effect YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
 
10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 8.33% 8.47% 9.09% 9.21%   8.21% 8.27% 8.78% 9.06% 
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2.4.5 Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Alternative Definitions of 
Career Background 
In this section, alternative definitions of career paths are used to examine the effects 
of career paths on fund performance. We define a manager’s primary career 
background according to the highest position he/she achieved in his/her prior work 
experience. Subsequently, we define a manager’s primary career background 
according to the longest tenure in his/her prior work experience. 
 
2.4.5.1 Defined as Highest Position 
A fund manager in our sample may have one or multiple of the four distinct work 
experiences on her resume: (1) She may have worked as part of an administrative staff 
or official for the government, in which case we assign a categorical ID of 
Government; (2) she may have worked as staff or as a manager for a commercial bank 
(Banking); (3) she may have worked as a trader or investment manager for the 
proprietary trading arm of a brokerage firm or other investment company 
(Investment); or (4) she may have worked as a research analyst or research manager 
of either a buy-side and/or a sell-side firm (Research). Dummy variables are created 
for each distinct categorical ID in a manager’s career path. As discussed in the first 
chapter, we use the “Career Scoring System” for each manager to calculate a 
categorical ID score. We then assign the categorical ID of the highest score as each 
manager’s primary career background.  
 
In this section, we define a manager’s primary career background based on the highest 
position she achieved in her prior work experiences to examine one of the extreme 
situations for our grouping.  
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TABLE 2.6 presents the regression results. After utilizing a different definition of 
primary career background, our main conclusions remain unchanged. Compared with 
managers who have a banking background, managers with government and research 
backgrounds exhibit superior performance, particularly after adjusting for risk factors. 
Managers with an investment background also perform better than those with a 
banking background, but the difference becomes nonsignificant after adjusting for 
additional risk factors. Nevertheless, it is notable that the estimates of career 
background dummies in TABLE 2.6 are smaller than those in TABLE 2.3 and less 
significant in some instances, which suggests that our approach of combining 
professional position and work tenure better reflects the influence of prior work 
experience on subsequent job performance.  
 
For other control variables, the higher expense ratio remains significantly negatively 
correlated with fund performance. However, the larger fund does not seem to perform 
better. There remains no evidence that there are any effects of fund age on fund 
performance. Meanwhile, when we define the primary career path by the highest 
position, jointly managed funds do not perform significantly worse. Funds continue to 
seem to obtain higher abnormal returns in the initial three-month period following 
managerial replacement. For other manager characteristics, the coefficient estimates 
for fund manager tenure are significantly negative. In addition, female managers 
continue to outperform their male counterparts due to their extraordinary ability to 
survive in the male-dominated Chinese mutual fund industry. There is some evidence 
that managers with a postgraduate degree perform well after controlling for risk 
factors, but there is no evidence that overseas experience leads to better fund 
management ability. Coefficients of multiple funds under management remain 
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nonsignificant in these regressions, and there is no evidence of the effects of fund 
manager age on fund performance. 
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TABLE 2.6: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Defined as Highest 
Position 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
fund performances on career background dummies, fund characteristics and other 
manager characteristics. The returns are presented as percentages. The t-statistics use 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are presented in parentheses. Time series 
averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
 
 Primary Career Background: Defined as Highest Position 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret CAPM Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Government 
0.17* 0.25  0.43** 0.69** 
(1.88) (1.34) (2.25) (1.98) 
Investment 
0.47*** 0.41* 0.24** 0.16  
(2.59) (1.66) (2.01) (1.17) 
Research 
0.26** 0.27  0.29** 0.54* 
(2.14) (1.37) (2.10) (1.89) 
Banking     
    
Fund age 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  
(0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.24) 
Log (TNA) 
0.33  0.31  0.32  0.19  
(0.64) (0.54) (0.85) (0.61) 
Expense ratio 
-6.82*** -6.58** -7.07*** -7.42*** 
(-4.06) (-1.99) (-2.62) (-2.89) 
Joint management 
-0.34** -0.21 -0.12 -0.17 
(-2.04) (-1.57) (-0.31) (-0.71) 
Managerial replacement 
0.29** 0.74** 0.24* 0.34* 
(2.00) (2.27) (1.95) (1.68) 
Fund manager tenure 
-0.03** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
(-2.52) (-2.36) (-2.94) (-2.74) 
Fund manager age 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
(-0.14) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.22) 
Sex 
-0.41 -0.68** -0.78** -0.71** 
(-1.57) (-2.01) (-2.27) (-2.18) 
Postgraduate degree 
0.14  0.19* 0.41** 0.38** 
(1.48) (1.74) (2.04) (2.01) 
Overseas experience 
-0.11 -0.13 -0.21 -0.19 
(-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.89) (-0.74) 
# of FUM 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
(-1.52) (-1.44) (-1.01) (-1.28) 
CONSTANT 
-0.28 -0.26 -0.41* -0.57* 
(-0.47) (-0.34) (-1.69) (-1.94) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 7.62% 7.51% 8.34% 8.67% 
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2.4.5.2 Defined as Longest Tenure 
In this section, we define a manager’s primary career background according to the 
longest tenure she achieved in her prior work experience to examine the other extreme 
situation for our grouping. TABLE 2.7 shows the regression results. Although the 
coefficients become less significant, our main findings remain similar. Compared with 
managers who have a banking background, managers with government and research 
backgrounds show significantly superior performance, except with respect to excess 
returns. Managers with an investment background also outperform those with a 
banking background in terms of raw returns. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates of 
career background dummies in TABLE 2.7 remain smaller than those in TABLE 2.3 
and less significant in some instances, which suggests that our approach of combining 
professional position and work tenure better reflects the influence of prior work 
experience on subsequent job performance.  
 
For the control variables, the expense ratio is significantly and negatively correlated 
with fund performance. However, larger funds and older funds do not seem to 
perform better. In addition, there is some evidence that jointly managed funds perform 
significantly worse. Funds tend to achieve higher performance in the initial 
three-month period following managerial replacement. For other managerial 
characteristics, the coefficient estimates for fund manager tenure remain significantly 
negative. In addition, female managers continue to outperform male mangers. The 
results show that managers with a postgraduate degree perform better, whereas there 
is no evidence that managers with overseas experience outperform those without such 
experience. The coefficients of multiple funds under management remain 
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nonsignificant here, and there is no evidence that different fund manager ages lead to 
different performance. 
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TABLE 2.7: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Defined as Longest 
Tenure 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
fund performances on career background dummies, fund characteristics and other 
manager characteristics. Regressions are carried out for each month, and mean 
coefficient estimates are reported. The returns are presented as percentages. The 
t-statistics use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are presented in parentheses. 
Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
 
 Primary Career Background: Defined as Longest Tenure 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret CAPM Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor Ab. 
Ret 
Government 
0.12* 0.18  0.35* 0.56** 
(1.72) (0.94) (1.89) (2.11) 
Investment 
0.56** 0.50  0.31  0.17  
(2.03) (1.29) (1.10) (0.88) 
Research 
0.21* 0.25  0.37* 0.42* 
(1.86) (1.37) (1.94) (1.88) 
Banking     
    
Fund age 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  
(0.95) (0.87) (0.66) (1.12) 
Log (TNA) 
0.26  0.49* 0.27  0.24  
(1.23) (1.92) (1.44) (1.13) 
Expense ratio 
-7.19*** -6.99*** -8.24*** -8.10*** 
(-5.14) (-4.26) (-3.79) (-3.35) 
Joint management 
-0.26** -0.17 -0.18* -0.14 
(-1.99) (-1.54) (-1.78) (-1.41) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.33** 0.54** 0.75** 0.47* 
(2.01) (2.31) (2.49) (1.95) 
Fund manager tenure 
-0.02** -0.03** -0.15*** -0.23*** 
(-2.54) (-2.04) (-3.04) (-3.42) 
Fund manager age 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
(-0.49) (-0.86) (-0.16) (-0.29) 
Sex 
-0.28** -0.47* -0.51** -0.66** 
(-2.17) (-1.93) (-2.14) (-2.27) 
Postgraduate degree 
0.17* 0.24** 0.38** 0.54*** 
(1.85) (2.25) (2.44) (2.68) 
Overseas experience 
-0.13 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 
(-0.84) (-0.40) (-1.01) (-0.65) 
# of FUM 
-0.07* -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
(-1.89) (-1.35) (-1.55) (-1.38) 
CONSTANT 
-0.42* -0.37 -0.67** -0.62* 
(-1.94) (-1.48) (-2.17) (-1.92) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 8.06% 7.91% 8.78% 8.92% 
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2.5 Other Robustness Tests 
2.5.1 Quality of Undergraduate Institution 
One potential – although unlikely – concern of our analysis is that the career 
backgrounds of fund managers may reflect skill or quality of education received. To 
address that concern, we create a variable that is a proxy for the quality of 
undergraduate institutions and add it as an additional control in our baseline 
performance regressions. The dummy variable, High Quality Undergraduate, equals 
one if a manager graduated from one of the “Project 211” universities, and zero 
otherwise.10 “Project 211” universities are designated by the Chinese government and 
are widely regarded as the top universities in China. “Project 211” universities are 
highly competitive in terms of their College Entrance Exam score requirement. 
Therefore, this control variable can capture some of the cross-sectional differences in 
skill; however, we cannot completely separate out skill from quality of education with 
this variable. TABLE 2.8 reports the results. It shows that coefficient estimates on 
High-Quality Undergraduate are all positive, although not significant, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that undergraduate study at “Project 211” universities 
proxy for better skill and/or education. More importantly, coefficient estimates on 
career background dummies and their significance are largely unchanged and are all 
consistent with the earlier baseline regression results shown in TABLE 2.3.  
                                                          
10 We create this variable based on information on managers’ resume and extensive 
web searches. Because managers engage in selective reporting on their resumes, we 
set the value to zero if we fail to recover information about a manager’s 
undergraduate institution. 
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TABLE 2.8: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Controlling for Quality of Undergraduate Institutions 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund performances on career background dummies, 
fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to the fund 
manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, we create multiple career background dummies for each individual career background 
in a manager’s career path. High-Quality Undergraduate is a dummy variable that equals one if a manager graduated from one of the 
“Project 211” universities, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are presented in parentheses. 
Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career Background 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM 
Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret  
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Government 
0.31* 0.24* 0.46* 0.65** 
 
0.41** 0.59* 0.74*** 0.78*** 
(1.82) (1.78) (1.94) (2.27) 
 
(2.51) (1.82) (2.64) (2.84) 
Investment 
0.38** 0.40* 0.24* 0.21 
 
0.32** 0.40 0.22* 0.16** 
(2.18) (1.89) (1.74) (1.37) 
 
(2.21) (1.58) (1.73) (2.10) 
Research 
0.32** 0.26 0.34* 0.52** 
 
0.39** 0.57* 0.64* 0.72** 
(2.42) (1.52) (1.88) (2.14) 
 
(2.48) (1.74) (1.89) (2.47) 
Banking 
    
 
-0.52** -0.39 -0.46 -0.42* 
    
 
(-1.98) (-1.28) (-1.33) (-1.82) 
Fund age 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.07) (0.18) 
 
(0.41) (0.47) (0.72) (0.89) 
Log (TNA) 
0.32 0.24 0.33 0.15 
 
0.48* 0.57** 0.61** 0.53** 
(0.74) (0.41) (1.65) (0.32)  (1.90) (2.41) (2.31) (2.00) 
Expense ratio 
-6.82*** -6.39** -6.44** -7.07*** 
 
-5.97*** -7.04*** -5.14*** -5.31*** 
(-2.75) (-2.08) (-2.48) (-2.61)  (-2.93) (-3.77) (-2.69) (-2.76) 
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Joint management 
-0.60** -0.28* -0.15 -0.23 
 
-0.16 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 
(-2.32) (-1.81) (-0.52) (-0.84) 
 
(-0.94) (-0.40) (-0.10) (-0.02) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.71* 0.83** 0.65** 0.50* 
 
0.39** 0.18* 0.06 0.15 
(1.89) (1.98) (2.34) (1.89) 
 
(2.41) (1.83) (1.04) (1.42) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.02** -0.03** -0.02** -0.02** 
 
-0.05** -0.04* -0.02 -0.01 
(-2.26) (-2.32) (-2.28) (-2.18)  (-2.08) (-1.87) (-0.89) (-0.95) 
Sex 
-0.41 -0.44* -0.66*** -0.47** 
 
-0.36** -0.26** -0.52* -0.58** 
(-1.54) (-1.83) (-2.72) (-2.01) 
 
(-2.24) (-2.00) (-1.91) (-2.08) 
High-quality 
undergraduate 
0.42 0.37 0.62 0.64  0.38 0.32 0.58 0.61 
(1.18) (0.88) (1.30) (1.41)  (1.04) (0.75) (1.24) (1.29) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.13 0.10 0.14 0.18 
 
0.22 0.18 0.17 0.20 
(1.27) (1.05) (1.32) (1.46) 
 
(1.49) (1.30) (1.26) (1.55) 
Overseas 
experience 
-0.10 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 
 
-0.12 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 
(-0.39) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.60) 
 
(-0.36) (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.10) 
# of FUM 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 
 
-0.08* -0.09* -0.22 -0.26 
(-1.57) (-1.25) (-1.72) (-1.34) 
 
(-1.86) (-1.91) (-0.64) (-0.92) 
Fund manager age 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 
-0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 
(-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.19) 
 
(-1.10) (-0.55) (-0.44) (-0.52) 
CONSTANT 
-0.22 -0.26 -0.64** -0.58* 
 
-0.44 -0.47 -0.47 -0.68* 
(-0.86) (-1.14) (-2.11) (-1.83)   (-1.42) (-0.71) (-1.63) (-1.84) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
 
10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 7.53% 7.95% 9.84% 9.99%   8.61% 9.57% 10.46% 10.98% 
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2.5.2 Growth of New Money Flow 
There is evidence that fund performance is positively related to new money flow 
growth, and the expertise and connections of managers with a particular career 
background help funds attract new money flows beyond their asset managing 
performance. Therefore, the effect of career backgrounds on fund performance that 
has been documented in the previous sections may be caused by the growth of the 
new money flow of funds. To address this issue, we incorporate new money flow 
growth rate in our analysis. TABLE 2.9 presents the regression results. Consistent 
with our previous results, the coefficient estimates on career background dummies all 
have the expected signs and remain significant, which suggests that our results are 
robust to controlling for the new money flow growth rate. Notably, the coefficient 
estimates on the new money flow growth rate are significantly positive, implying that 
fund performance is positively affected by new money flow growth. However, more 
importantly, coefficient estimates on career background dummies and their 
significance remain unchanged and are all consistent with our earlier baseline 
regression results shown in TABLE 2.3.  
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TABLE 2.9: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Controlling for New Money Flow Growth Rate 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund performances on career background dummies, 
fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to the fund 
manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, we create multiple career background dummies for each individual career background 
in a manager’s career path. New money flow growth rate is the growth rate of the net asset value of a fund. The t-statistics use 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are presented in parentheses. Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career Background 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM 
Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret  
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Government 0.21* 0.16* 0.47** 0.65** 
 
0.39** 0.48* 0.61*** 0.74*** 
 
(1.75) (1.84) (2.00) (2.18) 
 
(2.51) (1.87) (2.70) (2.86) 
Investment 0.32* 0.35* 0.22* 0.19* 
 
0.36** 0.45* 0.24  0.17* 
 
(1.91) (1.85) (1.74) (1.74) 
 
(2.27) (1.72) (1.54) (1.76) 
Research 0.27* 0.18 0.24* 0.48** 
 
0.41** 0.60* 0.74* 0.62** 
 
(1.84) (1.47) (1.76) (2.09) 
 
(2.53) (1.76) (1.92) (2.39) 
Banking 
     
-0.72** -0.67* -0.35 -0.47* 
      
(-2.19) (-1.84) (-1.62) (-1.78) 
New Money Flow 
Growth Rate 
1.46** 1.37** 1.72*** 1.83***  1.75* 1.66* 1.94** 1.96** 
(2.34) (2.19) (2.67) (2.88)  (1.86) (1.79) (2.04) (2.13) 
Fund age 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
(0.35) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23)  (0.53) (0.59) (0.64) (0.90) 
Log (TNA) 
0.20 0.22 0.34 0.31  0.38* 0.47** 0.41** 0.48** 
(0.37) (0.40) (1.62) (1.48)  (1.84) (2.36) (2.20) (2.39) 
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Expense ratio 
-6.14*** -5.90** -6.04** -6.59***  -5.07*** -6.42*** -5.04*** -5.12*** 
(-2.77) (-2.41) (-2.44) (-2.62)  (-2.66) (-3.14) (-2.68) (-2.76) 
Joint management 
-0.74** -0.57** -0.39* -0.34  -0.23 (0.17) -0.14 -0.11 
(-2.32) (-2.01) (-1.71) (-1.64)  (-1.46) (-1.14) (-0.85) (-0.64) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.64* 0.72* 0.83** 0.79*  0.52** 0.39* 0.23 0.20 
(1.82) (1.93) (2.07) (1.95)  (2.44) (1.89) (1.37) (1.26) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.02** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03**  -0.09** -0.07** -0.04 -0.03 
(-2.19) (-2.24) (-2.31) (-2.21)  (-2.27) (-2.03) (-1.55) (-1.14) 
Sex 
(0.34) -0.41* -0.54** -0.49**  -0.31** -0.34** -0.47** -0.52** 
(-1.38) (-1.82) (-2.11) (-2.05)  (-2.06) (-2.14) (-2.28) (-2.33) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.18* 0.17* 0.20** 0.24**  0.21* 0.23 0.33* 0.40* 
(1.93) (1.80) (1.98) (2.24)  (1.84) (1.64) (1.80) (1.93) 
Overseas 
experience 
-0.10 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16  -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 (0.08) 
(-0.31) (-0.72) (-0.76) (-0.72)  (-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.12) 
# of FUM 
-0.08* -0.05 -0.01 -0.01  -0.06* -0.08* -0.10** -0.14* 
(-1.79) (-1.60) (-1.42) (-1.35)  (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.98) (-1.91) 
Fund manager age 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
(-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.04) (-0.17)  (-0.84) (-0.71) (-0.43) (-0.49) 
CONSTANT 
-0.22 -0.16 -0.89** -0.74**  -0.41 -0.62 -0.58 -0.75* 
(-0.56) (-0.87) (-2.38) (-2.06)   (-1.35) (-1.26) (-1.30) (-1.82) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264  10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 7.36% 7.45% 9.51% 9.70%   8.08% 9.11% 9.96% 10.49% 
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2.5.3 Categorical ID Scores 
Another potential concern of our analysis is the use of multiple dummy variables in 
estimating the effects of individual career backgrounds in potentially multiple-career 
work experiences (i.e., Panel B, TABLE 2.3) because the use of a dummy variable 
implicitly assumes that individual career backgrounds are of equal importance 
regardless of work tenure. To address this concern, we re-estimate Panel B, TABLE 
2.3 using categorical ID scores of each work experience directly rather than using 
dummies. Specifically, we assign a position score of 1-4 to each career position 
according to the level of the position on the career ladder within each of the four 
working experiences. For each manager, we then calculate four categorical ID scores 
of 
Categorical ID Scorej = ∑ Position Scorej,k
Tenurej,k
Total Tenure
4
k=1 , 
 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 is the score of career position k in working experience j, 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 is the number of years a manager spent in position k of experience j, and 
Total Tenure is the total number of years of prior work experience that a fund 
manager has. Categorical ID scores measure the relative importance of each work 
experience in a career path, and they are comparable across persons. TABLE 2.10 
reports the results. These results indicate that our inferences are robust to accounting 
for the tenure of each experience. 
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TABLE 2.10: Fund Performance and Manager Career Paths: Individual Career 
Backgrounds with Categorical ID Scores 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
fund performances on individual career background categorical ID scores, fund 
characteristics and other manager characteristics. We use the categorical ID scores for 
each individual career background in a manager’s career path. Regressions are carried 
out for each month, and mean coefficient estimates are reported. The returns are 
presented as percentages. The t-statistics use Newey-West adjusted standard errors 
and are presented in parentheses. Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Performance Measures 
 
 Individual Career Background with Categorical ID Scores 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret CAPM Ab. Ret 
Four-Factor Ab. 
Ret 
Government 
0.13** 0.20* 0.26** 0.35*** 
(2.16) (1.89) (2.25) (2.77) 
Investment 
0.10* 0.12 0.09 0.11* 
(1.85) (1.47) (1.54) (1.86) 
Research 
0.14** 0.21* 0.21* 0.27** 
(2.20) (1.93) (1.89) (2.31) 
Banking 
-0.21** -0.14 -0.16 -0.16* 
(-2.13) (-1.41) (-1.49) (-1.91) 
Fund age 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.28) (0.35) 
Log (TNA) 
0.48** 0.26** 0.20** 0.19** 
(1.99) (2.35) (2.18) (2.14) 
Expense ratio 
-2.33*** -2.55*** -2.42*** -2.74*** 
(-2.76) (-3.52) (-3.21) (-3.84) 
Joint management 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
(-0.73) (-0.64) (-0.40) (-0.34) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.13** 0.06* 0.03 0.05 
(2.20) (1.77) (1.41) (1.49) 
Fund manager tenure 
-0.01* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(-1.86) (-1.64) (-0.95) (-0.84) 
Fund manager age 
-0.12* -0.09* -0.16* -0.17* 
(-1.86) (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.86) 
Sex 
0.10 0.04 0.16 0.19 
(0.84) (0.50) (1.38) (1.47) 
High-quality 
undergraduate 
0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 
(1.02) (0.84) (0.95) (1.32) 
Postgraduate degree 
-0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
(-0.49) (-0.12) (-0.08) (-0.06) 
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Overseas experience 
-0.03* -0.03* -0.07 -0.09 
(-1.82) (-1.78) (-0.96) (-1.24) 
# of FUM 
-0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
(-1.26) (-0.71) (-0.27) (-0.34) 
CONSTANT 
-0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.24** 
(-1.08) (-1.29) (-1.43) (-1.99) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 8.64% 9.17% 9.96% 10.15% 
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2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we examine the effects of manager career paths on fund performance. 
In the context of the Chinese mutual fund market, we find that fund performance 
differs across work experiences. Fund managers with banking as their primary career 
background significantly underperform on all performance measures, whereas 
managers with a government background exhibit the best risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns. Among the three better-performing groups, the government and research 
groups (two groups whose career paths seem likely to accumulate information 
advantages) improve their relative performance standing after controlling for risk 
factors, whereas the higher performance of managers with an investment background 
largely disappears. These return differences are robust to controlling for certain fund 
characteristics (such as fund size, fund age and expense ratios) and manager 
characteristics (such as manager age, tenure, and education). Separating out individual 
career backgrounds in a multiple-background career path, we can view the overall 
effect of a career path as the cumulative effect of each career segment. This approach 
leads us to similar findings regarding performance differences, confirming that our 
findings are not subject to the particularity in classifying primary career backgrounds.  
 
The basic intuition is that the different career paths of fund managers may lead to 
different investment abilities in constructing fund portfolios. Therefore, managers 
might achieve better fund performance through their specific investment and 
management abilities. Moreover, compared with fund managers who have a banking 
background, those with a government background may easily obtain more inside 
information through their political connections, and those with an investment 
background may have more investment experiences and a greater willingness to take 
65 
 
more risks in the market when constructing their fund portfolios. In addition, those 
with a research background may achieve better fund performance by utilizing their 
research analytical abilities when selecting stocks or timing the market. To confirm 
our conjecture, we will examine how career paths influence fund managers’ 
investment styles in the next chapter.    
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Chapter 3 Managerial Style and Manager Career Paths 
3.1 Introduction 
Work experience is a key factor in managerial hiring decisions. However, empirical 
evidence regarding work experience matters is very limited. There is also a question 
of management styles. For example, the investment principles advocated in MBA 
classrooms are more or less the same; however, fund manager investing styles differ, 
even within a fund style category. Little is known regarding how work experience 
shapes a manager’s management style. This paper aims to address this gap. 
 
Chapter 2 indicates that the relative performances of managers with various career 
backgrounds differ. The implication is that managers with different career paths tend 
to have different risk-taking attitudes and managerial abilities in fund management; 
consequently, they may have difference management styles. Fund managers use their 
“edge” in seeking abnormal returns (e.g., geographical proximity (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 2001). They incorporate the “edges” they accumulate along their career 
path into their managing styles.  
 
In this chapter, we provide evidence of the effect of work experience on management 
style by examining the connection between the work experiences of mutual fund 
managers prior to their fund management career and their fund management styles. 
First, the relationship between career paths of fund managers and their choices of 
factor loadings is investigated. We assess this relationship by using factor loadings in 
excess of the median in the respective self-reported fund styles in Wermers (2000). 
We therefore address the concern that managers with different career backgrounds 
may be chosen to run funds of matching styles. We find consistent patterns when we 
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group fund managers according to their primary or individual career background. 
Using fund managers with a banking background as our benchmark, managers with an 
investment background are willing to take significantly higher market-return risks and 
prefer a momentum strategy, whereas managers with a research or government 
background load on significantly less market risk. These two groups are also more 
likely to be contrarians. Moreover, managers with a banking background prefer to 
invest in larger and value firms, whereas the other groups prefer smaller glamour 
firms. Therefore, the high returns achieved by managers with an investment 
background are mainly driven by taking more systematic risk and chasing momentum. 
In contrast, managers with a research background, especially a government 
background, appear to possess an information advantage. 
 
Second, we examine the relationship between the career paths of fund managers and 
their management styles by investigating their investment abilities in both stock 
picking and market timing (Brown and Goetzmann, 1997), Chan, Chen, and 
Lakonishok, 2002). Specifically, the stock holdings of career background groups are 
assessed. To accomplish this aim, we develop three measures: 1) the concentration 
ratio, which measures a portfolio’s degree of concentration in top holdings; 2) the 
contribution ratio, which measures the proportion of performance-contributing stocks 
in a portfolio; and 3) the return gap (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2008), which 
measures timeliness in trading with private information.  
 
Consistent with the information advantage hypothesis, managers with government and 
research backgrounds hold portfolios with a significantly higher concentration ratio. 
They also have a higher contribution ratio and return gap. Interestingly, the portfolios 
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of managers with an investment background appear to be more diversified even 
compared with those of managers with a banking background.  
 
Next, we examine the market timing ability of different career background groups by 
following Bollen and Busse’s (2001) marketing timing measures. Our findings 
indicate superior stock-picking and market-timing abilities among managers with 
research or government backgrounds but do not indicate where the abilities originate. 
Their sources likely differ. It is plausible that work experience in stock research may 
better prepare a manager to identify and analyze value-relevant firm information or 
accumulate knowledge regarding specific firms or industries, which leads to a more 
concentrated portfolio. It is more difficult to picture how a career in government 
bureaucracy translates to better stock-picking and market-timing skills. These 
managers may, however, gain an information advantage through their political 
connections. In an economy such as China, where government influence is ubiquitous, 
political connections form an informational network. A connected fund manager may, 
for example, learn of the details of a government policy beforehand and determine 
which firms or time it will benefit. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. Our 
data and methodology are described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents our empirical 
analyses. The final section concludes the chapter and provides a discussion. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Under the broad debate of whether mutual fund managers possess investment 
abilities, an expansive literature search for the source of information advantage 
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managers may have leads to several important findings. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) 
indicate that mutual fund managers tilt holdings toward nearby companies, on which 
they earn a higher return, which suggests that geographic proximity is a source of 
information advantage. Similarly, Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) link 
instrument skill with city size. The authors report that funds run by experienced 
managers and located in financial centers perform better. Nanda, Wang, and Zheng 
(2004) provide evidence that fund families that follow more focused investment 
strategies across funds perform better, likely because of their informational 
advantages. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) and Tang (2013) suggest that industry 
knowledge is a source. Cohen et al. (2008) suggest that shared education networks 
between fund managers and board members represent an informational channel. Our 
study adds to the list and suggests career experience as an additional channel of 
information advantage. 
 
Over the previous decade, archival research in Accounting and Finance began to 
explore the idiosyncratic influence of individuals on corporate decisions. In their 
seminal work, Bertand and Schoar (2003) identify specific managerial styles with 
respect to firm decisions and determine that managerial styles are especially important 
in acquisition and dividend decisions, dividend policy, interest coverage and 
cost-cutting policy. Graham, Harvey and Puri (2010) provide evidence that CEO 
behavior is associated with overconfidence (see also, Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005) and that US-based CEOs are more optimistic than their non-US 
counterparts (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Kaplan et al. (2012) indicate that 
CEOs with greater overall talent are associated with better performance. Moreover, 
male CEOs exhibit relative overconfidence (Huang and Kisgen, 2013) and tend to 
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have a higher debt ratio (Graham, Campbell and Puri, 2013). Finally, firms with 
higher historical and future growth rates tend to be run by younger CEOs. 
 
Another strand of literature, mostly in corporate finance, studies the connection 
between managers’ employment experiences—and life experiences in general—and 
management styles. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) find that CEOs who grew up 
during the Great Depression lean excessively on internal finance, while CEOs with 
military experience pursue more aggressive leverage policies. Schoar and Zuo (2011) 
also examine how early experiences affect a manager’s career path. Dittmar and 
Duchin (2013), similar to our paper, focus on the role of employment experience. 
These authors indicate that a CEO’s prior employment experience affects corporate 
financial and corporate savings decisions. Our paper differs from these studies in that 
while these studies primarily document the effect of life experience on managerial 
styles, we directly investigate the effect of work experience on managerial experience. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
We focus on actively managed, Chinese domestic, open-end equity mutual funds.11 
Our main sample is created by merging fund data from the Wind Database12 with 
data from Tianxiang13 and the CSMAR Database. The Wind Mutual Fund Database 
provides information regarding fund returns and other fund and manager 
characteristics, such as the fund age, fund size, fund expense ratio, fund manager 
education background, and fund manager age. We use monthly return data throughout 
                                                          
11 We select “equity” and “equity-majority” in the fund type. We then eliminate index 
funds and international funds from the sample. Additionally, we exclude observations 
from funds with less than one year of history. 
12 http://www.wind.com.cn/ 
13 http://www.txsec.com.cn/ 
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a style analysis. The holding information is only available semi-annually because of 
reporting requirements. Our stock and market return data originate from the CSMAR. 
Our main sample spans from January 2002 to December 2011. To limit the effect of 
potential data error and extreme values, we delete the observations with fund raw 
returns in the top and bottom 1% of the sample. As described in TABLE 3.1, our final 
sample includes 369 open-ended equity funds and 542 fund managers in 48 fund 
families.  
 
  
72 
 
TABLE 3.1: Summary Statistics of Fund and Manager Characteristics 
This table summarizes the statistics for the sample of actively managed Chinese 
equity mutual funds. For dummy variables, the first column (#) reports the number of 
observations in which the dummy variable equals one. 
 
 
# Min Median Mean S.D. Max 
Number of fund-month obs. 10,264      
Number of fund-semi-annual 
obs. 
2,456      
Number of funds  369      
Number of fund managers 542      
Fund Characteristics 
Fund age  1.32 5.30 4.96 2.18 10.60 
Log (TNA) (Million Yuan)  1.72 3.41 3.33 0.61 4.52 
Expense ratio (%)  0.00 0.13 0.16 0.01 1.14 
Joint management  4,847 0.00  0.47  1.00 
Managerial replacement  2,722 0.00  0.27  1.00 
Primary Career Background 
Government 42 0.00  0.08  1.00 
Banking 36 0.00  0.07  1.00 
Investment 221 0.00  0.41  1.00 
Research 243 0.00  0.44  1.00 
Multiple Career Background 
Government  58 0.00  0.11  1.00 
Banking  63 0.00  0.12  1.00 
Investment  369 0.00  0.68  1.00 
Research 384 0.00  0.71  1.00 
Other Manager Characteristics 
Political connection 162 0.00  0.30  1.00 
Sex  428 0.00  0.79  1.00 
Postgraduate degree  515 0.00  0.95  1.00 
Overseas experience  76 0.00  0.14  1.00 
Fund manager tenure  1.00 3.00 2.66 1.13 8.00 
Fund manager age  27.00 36.00 36.66 3.91 52.00 
# of FUM    1.00 3.00 3.00 1.52 7.00 
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3.3.1 Measurement of Manager Career Paths 
From a sample of Chinese fund managers, we manually classify each segment of a 
manager’s entire career path into four categories: Government, Investment, Research, 
and Banking. We then examine the impact of the primary career background, which is 
defined according to the level of a manager’s position and the length of time that she 
remains in that position, and the impact of the individual career background in a 
multiple-career path on fund performance and investment style. We subsequently 
classify all fund managers into political and non-political connections, which are 
defined according to the presence or absence of significant work experience in 
government or state-owned enterprises prior to becoming a fund manager.  
 
A crucial component of our data consists of information regarding the career paths of 
fund managers that led to their current positions. We start with fund manager 
biographies available in the Wind and Tianxiang Database and supplement with 
information from the Internet through an extensive search procedure. We then 
manually assign each segment of a fund manager’s prior career into different 
categories. A fund manager in our sample may have one or more of four distinct work 
experiences in her resume: (1) She may have worked as an administrative staff 
member or official for the government, in which case we assign the segment to the 
category of Government; (2) she may have worked as a staff member or manager for a 
commercial bank (Banking); (3) she may have worked as a trader or investment 
manager for a proprietary trading arm of a brokerage firm or other investment 
company (Investment); and/or (4) she may have worked as a research analyst or 
research manager of either a buy-side or sell-side firm (Research). Dummy variables 
are subsequently created for each distinct categorical ID in a manager’s career path. 
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The number of paths in each category is tabulated in TABLE 3.1. The majority of the 
managers, 472 of 542, have multiple work experiences. For managers with multiple 
prior work experiences along their career paths, we are also interested in the effect of 
the primary career background on fund management. To classify each manager’s 
career into a unique career background, we use a “career scoring system” that 
combines the career position with the amount of time that a manager remains in that 
position. Specifically, we assign a position score of 1-4 to each career position 
according to the level of the position in the career ladder within each of the four work 
experiences described. For each manager, we then calculate a categorical ID score as 
follows: 
Categorical ID Scorej = ∑ Position Scorej,k
Tenurej,k
Total Tenure
4
k=1 , 
 
Where the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 is the score of career position k in work experience j, 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 is the number of years a manager spent in position k of experience j, and 
Total Tenure is the total number of years of prior work experiences. We subsequently 
assign the categorical ID of the highest score as each manager’s primary career 
background.14 
 
For example, an individual who worked 2 years as a project manager and 1 year as a 
sub-branch general manager at the China Merchants Bank, 1 year as an analyst at 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, and 1 year as an investment manager at China CITIC has 
a categorical ID score of 2*(2/5) + 3*(1/5) = 1.4 for Banking, 1*(1/5) = 0.2 for 
                                                          
14 Dividing the score by the total tenure has no effect on assigning categorical IDs 
because each individual has one (same) total tenure. This procedure does, however, 
impact the outcome when the categorical ID scores of each individual career are used 
in regressions of potential multiple careers in TABLE 2.10. 
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Research, and 2*(1/5) = 0.4 for Investment. Her primary career background is 
designated as Banking. Appendix describes in detail the score assignment and the 
“Career Scoring System”. 
 
Therefore, as described in TABLE 3.1, of the 542 fund managers in our sample, 42 
have a primary career background classified by categorical ID as Government, 36 are 
classified as Banking, 221 are classified as Investment, and 243 are classified as 
Research. 
 
3.3.2 Other Fund Characteristics 
Previous studies suggest that fund characteristics, such as fund age (Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997)), fund size (Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004)), and expense ratios 
(e.g., Carhart (1997)), help predict fund performance. We control for these fund 
characteristics in our analysis. As described in TABLE 3.1, the average age of all 
funds is approximately 5 years, and the average fund size, measured in logarithm (10 
based) of TNA (in million Yuan), is 3.33. Moreover, the mean expense ratio is 
approximately 0.16% per month, which translates to an annual rate of 1.92%. These 
figures are consistent with other studies of Chinese equity funds. 
 
3.3.3 Other Manager Characteristics 
TABLE 3.1 also reports the summary statistics of other controlling variables of 
manager characteristics. The Chinese mutual fund managers in our sample are 79% 
male (Sex equals one). Ninety-five percent have a postgraduate degree, and 14% have 
had overseas study or work experiences. The average fund manager tenure is less than 
3 years, which is approximately one year shorter than the average tenure of American 
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fund managers in Chevalier and Ellison (1999a). Many managers manage multiple 
funds, and the average number of funds under management is three. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Factor Loadings and Manager Career Paths 
In this section, we examine the relation between the career paths of fund managers 
and their choice of factor loadings in detail. Thus, we investigate how career paths 
impact fund management styles (Brown and Goetzmann (1997), Chan, Chen, and 
Lakonishok (2002)). 
 
Intuitively, career paths may lead to different fund management styles for two 
reasons. First, the same personal traits that influence career path may influence fund 
management style. For example, traders are often said to be overconfident. 15 
Managers who spent most of their prior careers as traders (therefore, in the Investment 
group) are likely to take on more systematic risk in fund management. Second, a 
specific management style can be a result of the relative advantage that a manager 
derives from her career path. A manager with a Government career background may 
enjoy firm-specific private information and load less on systematic risk. By the same 
token, managers who predominately covered growth stocks in their previous research 
analyst careers are likely to tilt their portfolio toward growth stocks. 
 
3.4.1.1 Raw Factor Loadings 
To construct our analysis, following Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we calculate the 
beta for each mutual fund-month in our sample as the index of systematic risk loading 
                                                          
15 Previous research has linked investment style to personal traits. Barber and Odean 
(2001), for example, identify gender differences in excessive trading. 
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by regressing the fund’s monthly excess returns on the monthly excess return of the 
market portfolio.  
 
Prior studies suggest the use of investment portfolio characteristics as risk factor 
loadings, which have persistent power in explaining cross-sectional fund performance. 
Specifically, Fama and French (1993) construct a zero-investment portfolio as a SMB 
portfolio, in which the shares of small firms are bought and the shares of large firms 
are sold, and demonstrate that the shares of small firms have consistently 
outperformed the shares of large firms. They also construct a zero-investment 
portfolio as a HML portfolio, in which the shares of firms with a high book-to-market 
ratio are purchased and the shares of firms with a low book-to-market ratio are sold, 
and demonstrate that the shares of high book-to-market ratio firms outperform the 
market portfolio. Moreover, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
construct a portfolio as a MOM portfolio, in which the previous year’s winners are 
bought and the previous year’s losers are sold. These authors indicate that firms that 
outperformed the market portfolio in the previous 12 months tend to do the same in 
the current year. We utilize Carhart’s (1997) four-factor regression for each fund to 
estimate its exposure to market return and other risk factors. Following Nanda, Wang 
and Zheng (2004), the measure of risk-adjusted return is computed as follows: 
Raw returni,t − rft
= αi + βi,M(MarketRt − rft)
+ βi,SMBSMBt + βi,HMLHMLt + βi,MOMMOMt + εi,t 
 
where Raw returni,t is the raw return of fund i in time t, rft is the risk-free rate, and 
MarketRt is the market rate in time t. Additionally, this equation introduces the 
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independent variables given by the returns of four zero-investment factor portfolios. 
The expression MarketRt - rft denotes the excess return of the market portfolio over 
the risk-free rate. SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt represent the returns of factor-mimicking 
portfolios of size, value and momentum. A positive (negative) 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵 indicates that 
the fund is oriented toward small (large) stocks. Similarly, a positive (negative) 
coefficient 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿 indicates that the fund has a tilt toward value (growth) stocks, and 
a positive (negative) 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀  indicates that the fund leans toward momentum 
(contrarian).  
We subsequently match the estimates of the factor loadings to managers and conduct 
a Fama-Macbeth regression similar to the regression in Chapter 2, with factor loading 
estimates as dependent variables. TABLE 3.2 reports the results. Panel A in TABLE 
3.2 describes the raw risk loadings regressed on the primary career backgrounds of the 
fund managers. Panel B in TABLE 3.2 describes the raw risk loadings regressed on 
the individual career backgrounds of the fund managers. 
For systematic risk, in both panels, fund managers from an Investment group are more 
likely to manage the funds with higher market risk loadings because the coefficient 
estimate of the Investment group is significantly positive, which indicates that they 
prefer to take more systematic risk in the market to construct their fund portfolio. 
However, the fund managers who are in the Government group do not prefer to take 
more systematic risk loadings in their fund portfolio because the coefficient estimate 
of the Government group dummy is significantly negative. The estimate reflects that 
the coefficient of market risk-adjusted returns for the Investment group decreases, 
whereas the coefficient for the Government group increases. Moreover, the systematic 
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risk taking of the fund managers in the Research group is insignificant. Additionally, 
in the other columns of Table 4, we provide the regression results of the fund factor 
loadings for each fund-month regressed by the career paths of the fund managers. 
Significantly positive relations among the Investment group, size factor and 
momentum factor are identified, as is a slightly significant negative relation between 
the Investment group and book-to-market factor. The potential explanation for these 
findings is that the fund managers in the Investment group are more likely to hold the 
“glamour” stocks that are more risky. Furthermore, they also prefer to follow the 
momentum strategy as their investment plan. We also document that managers with 
Government and Research backgrounds load more on growth stocks and do not 
follow a momentum strategy to construct their fund portfolio. The basic intuition is 
that fund managers from Government and Research groups have unique abilities to 
construct their fund portfolios. A Banking background has significantly different 
loadings in value factors compared with the other groups. This group loads more on 
value stocks.  
 
We subsequently examine some of the control variables. Larger funds, perhaps 
inevitably, load more on market risk. They invest relatively more in growth socks and 
do not chase momentum. Regarding other fund characteristics, funds with higher 
expense ratios take more risk loadings; however, they prefer to obtain valued stocks. 
Additionally, jointly managed funds prefer to load more risks to obtain stocks. Funds 
appear to reduce market risk loadings and invest in growth stocks in the initial 
three-month period when there is managerial replacement. Funds managed by a fund 
manager with a long management tenure take less market risk loading but bear more 
of the other factor loadings. Female managers take more risk loadings; however, they 
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have very good fund performance, which indicates that they must have other 
extraordinary abilities to survive. Moreover, managers who have a postgraduate 
degree take less risk loadings intentionally, whereas managers with overseas 
experience prefer to chase momentum. Managers with multiple funds under 
management also appear to significantly chase momentum. Finally, older fund 
managers are likely to take more risk loadings in the market, which is consistent with 
the finding that younger managers garner more abnormal returns than older managers 
in the Chinese fund market. 
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TABLE 3.2: Raw Factor Loadings and Manager Career Paths 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund risk loadings on career background dummies, 
fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to a fund 
manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, multiple career background dummies are created for each individual career 
background in a manager’s career path. The t-stats use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are denoted in parentheses. The Time 
Series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Raw Factor Loadings 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background Panel B: Individual Career Background 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
Government 
-0.06** 0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05** 
 
-0.30*** 0.01 -0.10*** -0.10*** 
(-2.42) (3.04) (-2.77) (-2.48) 
 
(-2.87) (1.24) (-4.17) (-3.16) 
Investment 
0.02** 0.04** -0.02* 0.05*** 
 
0.13** 0.06*** -0.08*** 0.05** 
(2.13) (2.14) (-1.69) (4.84) 
 
(2.42) (3.13) (-3.46) (2.13) 
Research 
-0.01 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.02* 
 
0.18 0.05*** -0.04** -0.03*** 
(-0.75) (4.61) (-4.89) (-1.73) 
 
(1.14) (2.69) (-2.34) (-2.84) 
Banking      
0.08* -0.12 0.05** 0.07* 
     
(1.69) (-1.06) (2.03) (1.81) 
Fund age 
0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(1.36) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.42) 
 
(0.06) (-0.42) (-0.23) (-0.13) 
Log (TNA) 
0.22*** -0.01 -0.02** 0.02** 
 
0.13*** -0.01* -0.08** 0.02** 
(4.87) (-1.62) (-2.01) (-2.13) 
 
(4.07) (-1.86) (-2.01) (2.09) 
Expense ratio 
0.97 0.98** 1.04** 0.74* 
 
0.86 0.75** 1.04 0.84 
(0.61) (2.20) (2.16) (1.81) 
 
(0.21) (2.24) (1.31) (0.86) 
Joint 
management 
-0.02 0.02*** -0.04*** 0.04*** 
 
-0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.05*** 
(-1.54) (4.91) (-3.98) (4.94) 
 
(-0.64) (1.04) (-0.52) (3.88) 
Managerial 
replacement 
-0.04*** -0.01 0.04** 0.01 
 
-0.07*** -0.02 0.02 0.02 
(-3.64) (-1.16) (2.52) (0.85) 
 
(-3.49) (-1.58) (0.98) (0.61) 
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Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.02* -0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
-0.01** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02 
(-1.82) (-5.29) (7.82) (7.15) 
 
(-2.23) (-2.96) (3.07) (0.82) 
Sex 
0.08*** 0.03 -0.12*** 0.04*** 
 
0.09*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.01 
(4.84) (0.83) (-8.14) (3.19) 
 
(3.99) (0.82) (-4.36) (0.54) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
-0.03* 0.02*** 0.07*** -0.03 
 
-0.04*** 0.03* 0.06*** -0.01 
(-1.94) (3.18) (4.09) (-0.12) 
 
(-2.72) (1.68) (3.27) (-0.47) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.02 0.03** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 
0.04* 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 
(1.07) (2.01) (10.16) (5.38) 
 
(1.74) (2.88) (3.39) (5.84) 
# of FUM 
-0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 
 
-0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03** 
(-0.72) (0.43) (0.61) (2.59) 
 
(-0.45) (1.26) (0.51) (2.02) 
Fund manager 
age 
0.03*** -0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 
0.01*** -0.03*** 0.03 0.04*** 
(2.78) (-1.99) (2.84) (2.49) 
 
(5.87) (-2.58) (1.42) (4.24) 
CONSTANT 
0.66 -0.15** 0.29*** 0.11*** 
 
0.52*** -0.12*** -0.17*** 0.26*** 
(1.19) (-2.12) (6.14) (3.03)   (3.78) (-3.02) (-3.05) (6.89) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
 
10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 9.85% 9.78% 10.02% 10.11%   9.92% 9.34% 9.89% 10.01% 
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3.4.1.2 Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings 
The pattern observed in the previous section leads to another important point. 
Namely, it is possible that mutual funds choose to hire managers of different career 
paths to suit different fund styles. Thus, the factor loadings and manager career 
characteristics can be jointly determined by the fund style. To alleviate these 
concerns, we study the relation using factor loadings in excess of the median loadings 
of the funds that exhibit the same self-reported style characteristics.  
 
TABLE 3.3 reports the results. The coefficient estimates on career dummies are 
similar across primary career background (Panel A) and individual career background 
(Panel B) estimations, which is consistent with the previous results. Because of 
information advantages, the managers with a Government background take 
significantly less market systematic risk, prefer small stocks and growth stocks and 
are more likely to be contrarian. In contrast, to obtain more fund performance, the 
managers with an Investment background take more market risk and chase 
momentum through their investment experience but not their skills. They are also 
oriented toward investing in small and glamour stocks. Given the presence of some 
knowledge and analysis skills, which potentially reflect the firm-oriented training in 
these managers’ analyst and research careers, the managers in the Research group do 
not take more market loadings or loadings on the momentum factor but load more on 
growth stocks. Finally, the managers with a Banking background take significantly 
different loadings in size and value factors compared with the other groups. These 
managers load more on large stocks and value stocks. Thus, they prefer more of the 
“blue chip” stocks. The estimates regarding the control variables are all consistent 
with the coefficient estimates of TABLE 3.2. 
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TABLE 3.3: Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings and Manager Career Paths 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of adjusted fund risk loadings on career background 
dummies, fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to a 
fund manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, multiple career background dummies are created for each individual career 
background in a manager’s career path. The t-stats use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are denoted in parentheses. The Time 
Series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career 
Background 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
Government 
-0.11*** 0.07*** -0.10*** -0.14*** 
 
-0.04* 0.05** -0.06*** -0.03** 
(-2.71) (3.54) (-2.94) (-4.94) 
 
(-1.76) (2.51) (-3.76) (-2.02) 
Investment 
0.16*** 0.03 -0.11*** 0.19*** 
 
0.02*** 0.02*** -0.04*** 0.01*** 
(2.64) (1.01) (-3.76) (6.32) 
 
(2.61) (3.03) (-3.31) (2.96) 
Research 
0.02 0.01 -0.09*** -0.21*** 
 
0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03* 
(1.27) (0.43) (-3.10) (-6.49) 
 
(1.37) (0.61) (-0.86) (-1.94) 
Banking      
0.06** -0.04** 0.06* 0.02 
     
(2.16) (-2.39) (1.71) (0.82) 
Fund age 
0.01 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.04*** 
 
0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (-7.86) (-0.76) (-3.62) 
 
(0.04) (-0.04) (-0.10) (-0.03) 
Log (TNA) 
0.06** 0.02*** -0.04* 0.02*** 
 
0.08*** -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 
(2.04) (3.24) (-1.79) (2.75) 
 
(2.62) (-1.01) (-1.74) (0.56) 
Expense ratio 
1.44* 0.05 0.05*** 0.02 
 
1.76** 1.28 1.75 1.76 
(1.79) (0.87) (3.89) (0.32) 
 
(2.19) (1.39) (1.42) (1.12) 
85 
 
Joint 
management 
-0.03** 0.02*** -0.08*** 0.12*** 
 
-0.06*** 0.03 -0.03 0.09*** 
(-2.03) (2.97) (-3.94) (9.58) 
 
(-3.57) (1.13) (-0.88) (4.07) 
Managerial 
replacement 
-0.03 0.04** 0.05*** 0.01 
 
-0.02 -0.05 0.06** 0.08*** 
(-1.31) (2.24) (2.81) (-0.62) 
 
(-1.16) (-1.17) (1.98) (2.62) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.08** -0.08*** 0.01 0.07 
 
-0.08** -0.02 0.03 0.03* 
(-2.54) (-3.74) (1.57) (1.57) 
 
(-2.13) (-0.61) (0.54) (1.81) 
Sex 
0.04 0.03* 0.02 0.02 
 
0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 
(0.94) (-1.76) (1.14) (0.44) 
 
(0.68) (0.92) (1.64) (0.62) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
-0.02*** 0.62** 1.22 0.72 
 
-0.02*** 0.07*** 0.03** -0.02*** 
(-3.43) (1.97) (1.63) (0.71) 
 
(-3.01) (3.88) (2.52) (-3.21) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.12* 0.01* 0.05* 0.01* 
 
0.1 0.04 0.09** 0.03*** 
(1.68) (1.71) (1.68) (1.72) 
 
(1.56) (0.76) (2.14) (5.85) 
# of FUM 
-0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.05*** 0.03 0.02 
(-0.33) (0.24) (0.47) (0.17) 
 
(-0.52) (-2.59) (0.58) (1.17) 
Fund manager 
age 
0.01*** 0.06** 0.04 0.02 
 
0.01*** -0.03** 0.08** 0.11*** 
(2.84) (2.49) (1.62) (1.54) 
 
(2.84) (-2.47) (2.01) (3.13) 
CONSTANT 
0.24*** -0.15*** -0.36*** 0.25*** 
 
0.18*** 0.75*** -0.10*** 0.39** 
(3.41) (-3.48) (-2.68) (5.69)   (3.03) (4.71) (-5.33) (2.32) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
 
10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 11.54% 11.71% 12.17% 12.18%   12.96% 12.53% 13.13% 13.06% 
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3.4.1.3 Robustness Tests 
To determine whether our results are subject to the estimation method we employed, 
we also utilize several alternative estimation methods. First, we use a rolling 
regression procedure. Specifically, at the end of each semi-annual period, we use the 
past 24 monthly returns to conduct the Carhart (1997) four-factor regression, which is 
the same as the equation in B.1.1. Because the rolling regression procedure is used, 
we allow the factor loadings of the funds to be time-varying. 
 
We subsequently match the estimates of the factor loadings to the managers and time 
periods and conduct the Fama-Macbeth regression with style-adjusted loading 
estimates as the dependent variables. This procedure allows us to attribute 
time-varying fund factor loadings relative to their same-style peers to funds, managers 
and managers’ career characteristics. 
 
TABLE 3.4 reports the results. The coefficient estimates on career dummies are 
largely consistent across primary career background (Panel A) and individual career 
background (Panel B) estimations. The managers with a Government background take 
significantly less market systematic risk, tilt toward small stocks and growth stocks, 
and are more likely to be contrarian. These management styles are consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers with a Government background are more likely to have 
firm-specific private information through their political connections. In contrast, the 
managers with an Investment background take more market risk and chase 
momentum. They are also oriented toward investing in small and glamour stocks. The 
coefficient estimate for the Research group regarding market risk loading is negative 
and significant at the 10% level, which may reflect the firm-oriented training in these 
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managers’ analyst and research careers. They load more on growth stocks; however, 
their preference for small stocks is relatively weak. They exhibit the most negative 
loading on the momentum factor. The differences in risk loading on the market and 
momentum factors between the mangers with Investment and Research backgrounds 
explain why the latter increasingly outperform the former after adjusting for the risk 
factors. Finally, the managers with a Banking background take significantly different 
loadings in size and value factors compared with the other groups. They load more on 
large stocks and value stocks. Thus, they prefer more of the “blue chip” stocks. 
 
Some estimates regarding control variables are still worthy of discussion. Older funds 
have less market risk loading and chase less momentum. Larger funds, perhaps 
inevitably, load more on market risk. They invest relatively more in large stocks and 
do not chase momentum. Older managers exhibit a statistically significant tendency to 
load less on market risk; therefore, they are more conservative. We do not find 
evidence that the manager tenure of Chinese mutual fund managers significantly 
affects their management styles. Interestingly, male managers take more risk, as 
suggested by the overconfidence hypothesis (e.g., Barber and Odean (2001)). 
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TABLE 3.4: Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings and Manager Career Paths: Rolling Estimation Approach 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund risk loadings on career background dummies, 
fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, one career background dummy is defined according to a fund 
manager’s primary career background. In Panel B, multiple career background dummies are created for each individual career 
background in a manager’s career path. At the end of each semi-annual period, the past 24 monthly returns are used to run the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model to estimate the risk loadings. The t-stats use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are denoted in 
parentheses. The Time Series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings 
  Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career 
Background 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
Government 
-0.07* 0.11** -0.13* -0.15*** 
 
-0.04* 0.03** -0.07** -0.03* 
(-1.92) (2.42) (-1.86) (-2.74) 
 
(-1.93) (2.02) (-1.97) (-1.72) 
Investment 
0.02** 0.05 -0.20*** 0.17*** 
 
0.03* 0.04*** -0.13 0.10** 
(2.05) (1.14) (-3.08) (3.16) 
 
(1.84) (2.97) (-1.64) (2.11) 
Research 
-0.01* 0.05 -0.17*** -0.21*** 
 
-0.02 0.03 -0.04* -0.06*** 
(-1.69) (1.22) (-2.75) (-3.89) 
 
(-1.62) (1.64) (-1.75) (-2.96) 
Banking      
0.02 -0.06** 0.05** 0.06* 
     
(1.31) (-2.21) (2.13) (1.68) 
Fund age 
-0.02** 0.02 0.02** -0.02*** 
 
-0.01*** 0.01 0.02 -0.02*** 
(-2.49) (0.64) (2.04) (-4.94) 
 
(-2.99) (0.65) (1.00) (-4.88) 
Log (TNA) 
0.17 -0.02 -0.04** -0.09*** 
 
0.15*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.09*** 
(1.62) (-1.56) (-2.41) (-7.15) 
 
(3.24) (-1.49) (-2.76) (-6.73) 
Expense ratio 
0.76 1.18*** 1.84** -1.75*** 
 
0.95 1.25*** 2.02*** -1.83*** 
(0.86) (2.64) (2.54) (-2.93) 
 
(1.30) (2.79) (2.81) (-3.10) 
89 
 
Joint 
management 
-0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.04* 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 
(-2.77) (1.03) (0.17) (1.87) 
 
(-1.13) (0.84) (0.21) (2.91) 
Managerial 
replacement 
-0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
(-1.09) (0.47) (-0.13) (0.71) 
 
(-0.08) (0.26) (-0.17) (0.88) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
-0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
(-0.21) (-0.62) (0.61) (0.85) 
 
(-0.86) (-1.35) (0.95) (1.21) 
Sex 
0.06* 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
 
0.09*** 0.01 -0.05 0.03 
(1.68) (0.23) (-1.24) (1.41) 
 
(2.81) (0.11) (-1.51) (1.01) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
-0.01 0.04* 0.07** -0.02 
 
-0.01 0.04** 0.08** -0.02 
(-0.26) (1.78) (2.02) (-0.59) 
 
(-0.31) (2.14) (2.26) (-0.81) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.02 -0.02 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 
0.01 -0.01 0.11*** 0.11*** 
(0.59) (-1.13) (4.51) (4.26) 
 
(0.05) (-0.75) (4.07) (4.37) 
# of FUM 
-0.02*** -0.02*** 0.01 0.04 
 
-0.02*** -0.02*** 0.01 0.02 
(-4.04) (-4.61) (0.73) (0.87) 
 
(-3.76) (-4.76) (0.83) (0.42) 
Fund manager 
age 
-0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01 
 
-0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01 
(-2.96) (-1.72) (-2.84) (-1.23) 
 
(-3.42) (-1.98) (-2.74) (-0.76) 
CONSTANT 
0.05 -0.07 0.18 0.47*** 
 
0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.06** 
(1.35) (-0.69) (1.29) (4.66)   (1.14) (-0.82) (0.15) (2.02) 
Obs. 2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
 
2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
Adjusted R2 7.42% 8.62% 9.54% 9.22%   7.04% 8.25% 9.33% 9.35% 
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3.4.2 Investment Abilities and Manager Career Paths 
3.4.2.1 Holding-based Measures—Stock-Picking Ability 
One immediate prediction that follows regarding stock holding is that the portfolios of 
these managers should be more concentrated. Thus, we begin by examining the 
concentration ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the market value of the top 10 
stock holdings over the total market value of a fund’s equity portfolio. 16  We 
subsequently investigate the fund managers’ consistency in picking stocks using a 
simple metric, i.e., the proportion of performance-contributing stocks in a portfolio. 
Specifically, if in a portfolio of n stocks, the number of stocks whose excess returns 
exceed the style-specific median is denoted as k, we calculate k/n.17 We refer to this 
measure as the contribution ratio. A higher contribution ratio indicates that a manager 
is likely to possess a consistent information advantage rather than only exhibiting 
luck. Finally, we examine the return gap, which is computed as the difference 
between the fund return and the hypothetical return of the portfolio holdings, 
following Kacperczyk et al. (2008). The return gap measures the unobserved actions 
of fund managers in timely trading stocks based on their private information. 
Kacperczyk et al. (2008) demonstrate that the return gap is positively correlated with 
performance persistence. We run the above holding-based measures through the 
Fama-Macbeth procedure on firm, manager and career characteristics, again leaving 
out the Banking career background as the benchmark case.  
 
TABLE 3.5 reports the average coefficient estimates of the cross-sectional 
regressions. We find the same results in both the primary career background and 
                                                          
16 The analysis is repeated using the top five and top three concentration ratios. The 
results remain consistent. 
17 For more detailed discussion of this metric, see Chung and Kim (2013). 
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individual career background. The concentration ratios are significantly different 
across the manager groups. The Government dummy has the highest point estimates 
of 2.46 and 1.33, respectively, in Panels A and B, followed by Research at 1.18 and 
0.65, respectively. Interestingly, the estimates for Investment are negative at -1.64 and 
-1.12, respectively, which are highly statistically significant and suggests that the 
managers with an Investment background hold portfolios even more diverse than the 
benchmark Banking group. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
managers with Government and Research backgrounds possess a private information 
advantage or stock-picking skills. Their higher abnormal returns documented in 
Chapter 2 are achieved through selection of and concentration on a relatively small 
number of stocks. TABLE 3.5 further indicates that these two groups have higher 
contribution ratios, which measure the proportion of above-median-performance 
stocks in a portfolio, and higher return gaps, which measure timeliness in trading. 
Estimates on the Investment dummy for the same measures, although positive, are 
either insignificant (contribution ratio) or only weakly significant (return gap). 
However, the relative standing of the Investment group across three measures 
suggests that managers with an Investment background rely more on timeliness in 
trading rather than stock picking in generating abnormal returns. 
 
Additionally, larger funds appear to have more information advantages in obtaining 
stocks. Younger managers exhibit little ability to choose high-performing stocks 
because of insufficient industry experience. We do not find evidence that a better 
education background significantly affects manager stock-picking ability.  
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TABLE 3.5: Holding-based Measures and Manager Career Paths 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of holding-based measures on manager career 
background dummies, fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. Panel A reports the primary career background, and panel B 
reports the individual career background. The concentration ratio is defined as the ratio of the market value of the top 10 stock holdings 
over the total market value of a fund’s equity portfolio. The contribution ratio is defined as the proportion of the number of stocks whose 
excess returns beat the style-specific median in a portfolio. The return gap is computed as the difference between the fund return and the 
hypothetical return of the portfolio holdings. The returns are shown in percentages. The t-stats are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variables: Holding-based Measures 
 
Panel A: Primary Career Background 
 
Panel B: Individual Career Background  
  
Concentration 
Ratio 
Contribution 
Ratio 
Return Gap 
 
Concentration 
Ratio 
Contribution 
Ratio 
Return Gap 
Government 
2.46*** 0.06* 0.40** 
 
1.33** 0.04* 0.69*** 
(3.06) (1.92) (2.01) 
 
(2.16) (1.69) (2.61) 
Investment 
-1.64*** 0.02  0.21* 
 
-1.12** 0.03  0.35** 
(-2.74) (1.21) (1.69) 
 
(-1.99) (1.32) (2.07) 
Research 
1.18* 0.05*** 0.40** 
 
0.65* 0.04** 0.56** 
(1.94) (3.06) (2.02) 
 
(1.73) (2.01) (2.18) 
Banking 
  
  
-0.52 -0.06** -0.77** 
  
(-1.09) (-2.21) (-2.20) 
Fund age 
0.09  0.02  0.01** 
 
0.09  0.03  0.01*** 
(1.01) (0.95) (2.47) 
 
(0.86) (1.07) (2.61) 
Log (TNA) 
1.73*** 0.16*** 1.83*** 
 
1.81*** 0.12*** 1.77*** 
(3.85) (2.81) (5.16) 
 
(3.48) (3.15) (5.13) 
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Expense ratio 
-14.12 -2.78*** -3.98*** 
 
-14.45 -1.92*** -3.93*** 
(-0.83) (-5.43) (-6.29) 
 
(-0.83) (-4.81) (-6.04) 
Joint management 
-0.56 0.01* -0.07 
 
-0.54 0.01* -0.07 
(-1.54) (1.72) (-0.31) 
 
(-1.49) (1.69) (-0.38) 
Managerial replacement 
-1.04 0.02** 1.69  
 
-1.08 0.02** 1.62  
(-0.94) (2.11) (0.42) 
 
(-0.84) (2.14) (0.26) 
Fund manager tenure 
0.21** -0.03** 0.12  
 
0.20** -0.02** 0.11  
(2.43) (-2.16) (0.38) 
 
(2.36) (-2.03) (0.29) 
Sex 
-1.90*** 0.04** -2.05 
 
-1.91*** 0.03** -2.03 
(-2.65) (2.13) (-1.19) 
 
(-2.73) (2.04) (-1.14) 
Postgraduate degree 
-0.30 0.02  1.33 
 
-0.28 0.02  1.35  
(-0.14) (1.09) (1.00) 
 
(-0.10) (0.98) (1.05) 
Overseas experience 
-1.13* -0.01 -2.24* 
 
-1.15** -0.01 -2.20* 
(-1.84) (-1.51) (-1.74) 
 
(-2.01) (-1.56) (-1.71) 
# of FUM 
-0.25 -0.01 0.15 
 
-0.27* -0.01 0.22  
(-1.58) (-0.28) (0.13) 
 
(-1.84) (-0.23) (0.30) 
Fund manager age 
-0.01* -0.01*** -0.03 
 
-0.02** -0.01*** -0.04 
(-1.73) (-2.74) (-1.41) 
 
(-1.98) (-2.82) (-1.49) 
CONSTANT 
-3.47** -0.12*** -0.49*** 
 
-2.21 -0.11*** -0.58*** 
(-2.42) (-2.71) (-4.77)   (-1.53) (-2.61) (-6.06) 
Obs. 2,456 2,456 2,456 
 
2,456 2,456 2,456 
Adjusted R2 4.33% 5.36% 5.26%   4.72% 5.43% 5.41% 
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3.4.2.2 Market Timing Measures—Market Timing Ability 
In this section, we examine the ability of mutual fund managers to time the market, 
that is, the ability to increase a fund’s exposure to the market index prior to market 
advances and to decrease exposure prior to market declines. Bollen and Busse (2001) 
express the four-factor TM regression and four-factor HM regression to inference 
regarding the market timing ability of mutual fund managers. Therefore, we follow 
their measures to examine the informational advantage or investment skills to time the 
purchases and sales of individual stocks and the career paths of fund managers.  
 
According to the Carhart Four-Factor Model, the three additional factors appear only 
as linear terms; thus, we do not estimate “factor timing” with the exception of the 
market factor. We express the four-factor TM regression as 
r𝑝,𝑡 = α𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝,𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡
2
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 
 
and the four-factor HM regression as  
r𝑝,𝑡 = α𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝,𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡
∗
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 
 
We estimate the parameters of the two models using monthly data to obtain 𝛾𝑝 to 
refer to the market timing ability of the fund managers. We subsequently conduct the 
Fama-Macbeth regression using 𝛾𝑝 on the left of the regressions. 
 
TABLE 3.6 reports the results. In Panel A of TABLE 3.6, the results indicate that the 
fund managers with Government, Research and Investment backgrounds have better 
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market timing abilities to time the purchase or sale of individual stocks. The 
coefficient estimates of the four-factor TM regression for Government, Research and 
Investment are 0.49, 0.27 and 0.41, respectively. One potential explanation is that the 
fund managers with a Government background have an informational advantage 
through their connections to time the trading. The fund managers with a Research 
background may catch more hidden information through their research analysis skills 
to adjust their portfolio. Additionally, the fund managers with an Investment 
background may have more investment experience, allowing them to rely more on 
timeliness in trading. The results shown in Panel B in TABLE 3.5 indicate similar 
results for individual career backgrounds. However, the fund managers with a 
Banking background also do not have a sense of timing to adjust their portfolios. An 
interesting question arises as to why fund companies continue to hire managers with a 
Banking background who exhibit poor skills and the worst performance.  
 
The estimates regarding the control variables also indicate several interesting patterns. 
First, the fund managers with younger funds or funds with a higher expense ratio find 
it difficult to time their trading in the market. Second, the fund managers with more 
related experience have better market-timing skills. Finally, the fund managers with a 
more extensive educational background are good at timing their trading because their 
knowledge and experience help them easily obtain the time trading information from 
the market. 
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TABLE 3.6: Market Timing Measures and Manager Career Paths 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
market timing measures on manager career background dummies, fund characteristics 
and other manager characteristics. The t-stats are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variables: Market Timing Measures 
 
Panel A: Primary Career 
Background  
Panel B: Individual Career 
Background 
  TM HM   TM HM 
Government 
0.49*** 0.24** 
 
0.52** 0.38*** 
(2.62) (2.01) 
 
(2.13) (2.64) 
Investment 
0.27* 0.18* 
 
0.31** 0.23* 
(1.94) (1.85) 
 
(1.98) (1.89) 
Research 
0.41** 0.32** 
 
0.39** 0.27* 
(2.51) (2.20) 
 
(2.04) (1.94) 
Banking 
  
 
-0.66*** -0.51** 
 
(-2.62) (-2.39) 
Fund age 
-0.02*** -0.01*** 
 
-0.02** -0.01* 
(-3.07) (-3.11) 
 
(-2.01) (-1.87) 
Log (TNA) 
0.95* 0.87* 
 
0.74 0.72 
(1.73) (1.71) 
 
(1.52) (1.46) 
Expense ratio 
12.64*** 11.15*** 
 
11.66*** 10.24*** 
(7.71) (7.11) 
 
(4.65) (3.42) 
Joint 
management 
0.24** 0.21** 
 
0.39* 0.27 
(2.32) (2.14) 
 
(1.71) (1.22) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.10 0.21 
 
0.05 0.08 
(0.54) (1.28) 
 
(0.06) (0.73) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
0.11* 0.09* 
 
0.23*** 0.21*** 
(1.94) (1.84) 
 
(3.02) (2.88) 
Sex 
-0.47 -0.33 
 
-0.19 -0.16 
(-1.00) (-0.87) 
 
(-0.60) (-0.51) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.32*** 0.47** 
 
0.34*** 0.29** 
(2.62) (2.05) 
 
(2.77) (2.27) 
Overseas 
experience 
-0.09 -0.14 
 
-0.16 -0.14 
(-0.83) (-1.64) 
 
(-0.53) (-0.21) 
# of FUM 
-0.47** -0.38* 
 
-0.26 -0.23 
(-1.98) (-1.74) 
 
(-1.62) (-1.39) 
Fund manager 
age 
-0.01* -0.01 
 
-0.01* -0.01* 
(-1.68) (-1.61) 
 
(-1.68) (-1.68) 
CONSTANT 
-0.85 -0.67 
 
-0.36** -0.27* 
(-1.54) (-1.29)  (-2.01) (-1.84) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 
 
10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 11.45% 11.27%  12.09% 12.58% 
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3.4.2.3 Robustness Test 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) developed an alternative measure of 
portfolio performance (thereafter, the DGTW measure), which uses benchmarks based 
on the characteristics of the stocks held by the portfolios that are evaluated. Based on 
this approach, “Characteristic Selectivity” and “Characteristic Timing” measure 
whether the fund managers can select stocks that outperform the average stocks with 
the same characteristics and whether they successfully time their portfolio weightings 
of these characteristics. Therefore, we rerun our tests on primary career background 
using the fund managers’ measures. 
 
TABLE 3.7 presents the results. Similar to the previous findings, the fund managers 
in the Government and Research groups exhibit significantly better stock-picking 
abilities because of their information advantage. The coefficient estimates are both 
significantly positive. However, the managers with an Investment background do not 
exhibit stock-picking ability for their portfolio. Furthermore, the fund managers with 
Government, Investment and Research backgrounds have better market timing 
abilities to trade their holding stocks. While the fund managers with a Government 
background have an informational advantage through their connections, the fund 
managers with a Research background have timing judgment through their research 
analysis skills. Moreover, the fund managers in the Investment group may have 
substantial investment experience to time the trading. In summary, these findings, 
including the control variables, are consistent with the findings discussed in the 
previous sections.  
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TABLE 3.7: DGTW Measure and Manager Career Paths 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
the DGTW measure on manager career background dummies, fund characteristics and 
other manager characteristics. Only data for the primary career background are 
reported. The t-stats are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 
5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: DGTW Measure 
  Characteristic Selectivity   Characteristic Timing 
Government 
0.49*** 
 
0.24** 
(2.62) 
 
(2.01) 
Investment 
0.27* 
 
0.18* 
(1.94) 
 
(1.85) 
Research 
0.41** 
 
0.32** 
(2.51) 
 
(2.20) 
Banking 
 
 
  
Fund age 
-0.02*** 
 
-0.01*** 
(-3.07) 
 
(-3.11) 
Log (TNA) 
0.95* 
 
0.87* 
(1.73) 
 
(1.71) 
Expense ratio 
12.64*** 
 
11.15*** 
(7.71) 
 
(7.11) 
Joint management 
0.24** 
 
0.21** 
(2.32) 
 
(2.14) 
Managerial replacement 
0.1 
 
0.21 
(0.54) 
 
(1.28) 
Manager tenure 
0.11* 
 
0.09* 
(1.94) 
 
(1.84) 
Sex 
-0.47 
 
-0.33 
(-1.00) 
 
(-0.87) 
Postgraduate degree 
0.32*** 
 
0.47** 
(2.62) 
 
(2.05) 
Overseas experience 
-0.09 
 
-0.14 
(-0.83) 
 
(-1.64) 
# of FUM 
-0.47** 
 
-0.38* 
(-1.98) 
 
(-1.74) 
Manager age 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
(-1.68) 
 
(-1.61) 
CONSTANT 
-0.85 
 
-0.67 
(-1.54) 
 
(-1.29) 
Obs. 10,264 
 
10,264 
Adjusted R2 11.45%   11.27% 
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3.4.3 Fund New Money Flows and Manager Career Paths 
Given the results in Chapters 2 and 3, it is natural to propose a question: why do fund 
management companies continue to hire fund managers with Banking experience 
when they are the worst performers with poor stock-picking and market-timing 
abilities? One possibility is that managers with a Banking career background can 
contribute other benefits to the fund families. It should be noted that Chinese local 
banks are allowed to offer fund products to corporate, retail and institutional clients in 
China. In fact, they represent the largest sales of fund products in China. Therefore, 
connections with banks held by managers with a Banking career background allow 
them to attract additional fund flows into the funds beyond their asset-managing 
performance. Our analysis of manager career paths and fund new money flows aims 
to provide answers in this area. 
 
3.4.3.1 New Money Flow Growth 
The fee structures of mutual funds dictate that revenues of fund managing companies 
crucially depend on assets under management and, by extension, new money flows. 
With a still-maturing financial service industry, banks in China dominate the retail 
distribution channel of mutual funds.18 Two factors contribute to their dominance. 
First, banks have extensive branch networks in place. Second, consumers are not yet 
savvy regarding the different types of financial products, and they tend to rely on 
banks for recommendations. It is against this background that the expertise and 
connections of managers with Banking work experience can be valuable resources for 
mutual funds. 
                                                          
18 By some estimates, China’s four largest banks accounted for more than 60% of 
mutual fund sales in 2011. See “Beijing opens up fund sales market”, Financial Times, 
June 26, 2011. 
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We calculate the new money flow to a fund from the change in the total net assets 
(TNA)—the net of the price appreciation in the fund assets, assuming that new money 
is invested at the end of each period. We subsequently normalize the new money flow 
by the TNA at the beginning of the period to obtain a measure for the new money 
flow growth rate. Namely, the new money flow growth (NMFG) is defined as 
follows: 
NMFG𝑖,𝑡 =
TNA𝑖,𝑡 − TNA𝑖,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡)
TNA𝑖,𝑡−1
 
 
The reporting requirement of Chinese mutual funds indicates that our new money 
flow growth measure has a semi-annual frequency. We then regress the new money 
flow growth on the previous period fund performance, as measured by the four-factor 
abnormal return, manager career background and other fund and manager 
characteristics, using the Fama-Macbeth and fixed-effect estimation methods 
previously discussed.  
 
TABLE 3.8 reports the results. We find that the managers with a Banking background 
help attract additional new money flow to their funds. The coefficients of the 
Investment and Research dummies, as measured by the primary career background 
(columns one and three), are all negative. They are significant at least at the 10% 
level. The coefficients of the Government dummies in the same columns are positive 
but largely insignificant. These findings suggest that controlling for performance, the 
managers with a primary Banking background have a greater ability to attract new 
money to the funds than the managers with Investment and Research backgrounds. 
The ability of managers with Investment and Research backgrounds to generate new 
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money flow is almost on par with that of the managers with a primary Government 
background. Examination of the estimates regarding individual career backgrounds 
(columns two and four) further indicates that work experience in Banking 
significantly and positively contributes to new money flow growth. Interestingly, the 
results in TABLE 3.8 also indicate that Chinese retail investors do respond to past 
fund performance; however, the estimates regarding fund characteristics, such as size, 
age, expense ratio and bank-affiliated fund dummy, are insignificant. Additionally, 
the fund managers with a postgraduate educational background exhibit a greater 
ability to attract new money than the managers with only an undergraduate 
background.  
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TABLE 3.8: New Money Flow Growth and Manager Career Paths 
This table examines the effect of fund manager work experience on fund new money 
flow growth. Panel A reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth 
regressions with Newey-West adjusted standard errors. Panel B reports the estimates 
with fund and time-fixed effects. The data are of semi-annual frequency. The t-stats 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: New Money Flow Growth (%) 
 
Panel A: Fama-Macbeth Estimates 
 
Panel B: Fixed-effect Estimates 
 
Primary Career 
Background 
Individual 
Career 
Background 
 
Primary Career 
Background 
Individual 
Career 
Background 
Government 
0.42* 0.34 
 
0.13 0.09 
(1.83) (1.42) 
 
(0.81) (0.48) 
Investment 
-1.57** -1.34** 
 
-0.82* -0.41* 
(-2.24) (-2.35) 
 
(-1.84) (-1.80) 
Research 
-1.26** -1.14** 
 
-0.69* -0.33* 
(-2.03) (-2.03) 
 
(-1.75) (-1.86) 
Banking 
 
1.15*** 
  
0.48** 
 
(2.63) 
  
(2.14) 
Bank affiliated 
funds 
1.18 1.02 
 
0.97 0.86 
(0.84) (0.66) 
 
(1.16) (1.02) 
Past performance 
(t-1) 
2.72** 2.48** 
 
1.44* 1.48* 
(2.34) (2.02) 
 
(1.70) (1.81) 
Fund age 
-0.13 -0.14 
 
-0.05 -0.04 
(-0.36) (-0.31) 
 
(-0.63) (-0.55) 
Log (TNA) 
0.98 0.86 
 
0.95 0.96 
(0.64) (0.47) 
 
(1.14) (1.15) 
Expense ratio 
-7.02 -6.75 
 
-5.84 -5.99 
(-1.00) (-0.69) 
 
(-1.40) (-1.43) 
Joint 
management 
1.04 0.81 
 
0.96 0.92 
(1.52) (1.38) 
 
(1.32) (1.20) 
Managerial 
replacement 
-0.62 -0.54 
 
-0.15 -0.18 
(-1.14) (-0.99) 
 
(-0.44) (-0.68) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
0.18 0.17 
 
0.04 0.04 
(0.74) (0.70) 
 
(0.54) (0.52) 
Sex 
-0.61 -0.55 
 
-0.15 -0.17 
(-1.14) (-0.97) 
 
(-0.59) (-0.62) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.65** 0.57** 
 
0.08* 0.09* 
(2.18) (1.99) 
 
(1.70) (1.74) 
Overseas 
experience 
-1.02 -1.08 
 
-0.42 -0.36 
(-0.74) (-0.86) 
 
(-1.34) (-1.07) 
# of FUM 
-0.15 -0.16 
 
-0.06 -0.06 
(-0.32) (-0.33) 
 
(-0.62) (-0.58) 
Fund manager 
age 
0.06* 0.08* 
 
0.02 0.02 
(1.81) (1.87) 
 
(0.67) (0.73) 
CONSTANT 
0.78*** 0.99*** 
 
0.42* 0.41* 
(2.96) (3.14)   (1.78) (1.83) 
Obs. 2,456 2,456 
 
2,456 2,456 
Adjusted R2 5.93% 6.02%   5.07% 5.01% 
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3.4.3.2 Performance Sensitivity  
TABLE 3.8 indicates that career backgrounds affect fund money flow. It is natural to 
question whether career backgrounds affect the sensitivity of money flow to past 
performance. To answer this question, we conduct separate horse-race regressions of 
new money flow on each primary career background against the remaining categories.  
 
The results, presented in TABLE 3.9, suggest not only that the managers with 
Banking backgrounds attract more money inflows but also that their money flows are 
also relatively less sensitive to past performance (t = 1.86). In two-way horse-races, 
the managers with a Government background are less sensitive to past performance, 
whereas the managers with Research (not significant) and Investment backgrounds 
are more sensitive to past performance. 
 
Overall, our findings indicate that the managers with a Banking background hold an 
advantage in generating new money flows. This finding is consistent with the 
dominance of banks in mutual fund share distribution in China and supports the view 
that work experience affects managerial performance through knowledge and 
connections established in their careers. 
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TABLE 3.9: New Money Flow Growth and Manager Career Paths: Performance 
Sensitivity 
This table examines the effect of fund manager work experience on fund new money 
flow growth, controlling for the last period of fund performance and other fund and 
manager characteristics. We run separate horse-race regressions of new money flow 
on each primary career background against the remaining categories. We report the 
mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions with Newey-West 
adjusted standard errors. The data are of semi-annual frequency. The dependent 
variable, new money flow growth, is represented as a percentage. Past performance is 
proxies by the four-factor abnormal return. The t-stats are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: New Money Flow Growth (%) 
GM 0.65** 
  
 
 
(2.23) 
  
 
GM*Past performance (t-1) -1.12* 
  
 
 
(-1.82) 
  
 
RA 
 
-0.62* 
 
 
  
(-1.68) 
 
 
RA*Past performance (t-1) 
 
1.54 
 
 
  
(1.29) 
 
 
IM 
  
-1.01* 
 
   
(-1.94) 
 
IM*Past performance (t-1) 
  
1.87* 
 
   
(1.73) 
 
Banking 
   
1.46*** 
    
(2.78) 
BN*Past performance (t-1) 
   
-1.23* 
    
(-1.86) 
Bank affiliated funds 1.14  1.08  1.02 0.95  
 
(0.61) (0.74) (0.68) (0.62) 
Past performance (t-1) 1.65* 1.97* 1.93* 2.14** 
 
(1.93) (1.89) (1.84) (2.23) 
Fund age -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 
 
(-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.22) 
Log (TNA) 0.94  0.82  0.99 1.35  
 
(0.62) (0.41) (0.68) (0.73) 
Expense ratio -6.55 -6.34 -6.82 -6.79 
 
(-0.89) (-0.51) (-1.31) (-1.16) 
Joint management 1.00  0.95  0.84 0.72  
 
(1.44) (1.36) (1.39) (1.43) 
Managerial replacement -0.55 -0.52 -0.47 -0.36 
 
(-1.02) (-0.95) (-0.86) (-0.64) 
Fund manager tenure 0.14  0.16  0.12 0.10  
 
(0.69) (0.72) (0.70) (0.85) 
Sex -0.57 -0.51 -0.58 -0.62 
 
(-1.03) (-0.88) (-1.00) (-0.98) 
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Postgraduate degree 0.58** 0.53* 0.62* 0.64* 
 
(2.06) (1.89) (1.91) (1.92) 
Overseas experience -0.91 -1.02 -1.14 -1.25 
 
(-0.60) (-0.77) (-1.23) (-1.46) 
# of FUM -0.13 -0.15 -0.19 -0.24 
 
(-0.28) (-0.31) (-0.65) (-0.77) 
Fund manager age 0.05* 0.07* 0.06* 0.05* 
 
(1.74) (1.80) (1.74) (1.71) 
CONSTANT -0.72*** 0.81*** 0.92** -1.24*** 
  (-2.71) (2.89) (2.48) (-3.41) 
Obs. 2,456 2,456 2,456 2,456 
Adjusted R2 7.20% 7.31% 7.23% 7.23% 
 
  
106 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
In this Chapter, we investigate how career paths influence fund manager investment 
styles. We first investigate the issue using factor loadings from the Carhart 
Four-factor Model and subsequently examine fund managers’ stock-picking and 
market-timing abilities.  
 
We identify consistent patterns whether fund managers are grouped according to their 
primary or individual career background. Benchmarking against managers with a 
Banking background, managers with an Investment background take significantly 
more market return risk and incline to a momentum strategy, whereas managers with 
Research and especially Government backgrounds load on significantly less market 
risk. The latter two groups are also more likely to be contrarian. Uniquely, managers 
with a Banking background prefer to invest in larger and value firms, whereas the 
other groups prefer smaller glamour firms. Therefore, the high return achieved by 
managers with an Investment background is mainly attributable to their greater 
holdings of systematic risk and momentum chasing. In contrast, managers with 
Research and especially Government backgrounds appear to hold an informational 
advantage. 
 
To further investigate the information advantage hypothesis, we examine the stock 
holdings of career background groups. Managers with Government and Research 
backgrounds hold portfolios with a significantly higher concentration ratio. They also 
have a higher contribution ratio and return gap. Interestingly, the portfolios of 
managers with an Investment background appear to be more diversified even 
compared with those of managers with a Banking background. 
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Our analyses indicate superior stock picking and market timing by managers with 
Research and Government backgrounds; however, they do not indicate where the 
abilities originate. Their sources likely differ. It is plausible that work experience in 
stock research may better prepare a manager to identify and analyze value-relevant 
firm information and better market timing or accumulate knowledge of specific firms 
or industries, which leads to a more concentrated portfolio.19 It is more difficult to 
determine how a career in government bureaucracy translates to better stock-picking 
and market-timing skills. However, these managers may gain an information 
advantage through their political connections. In an economy such as China, where 
government influence is ubiquitous, political connections form an informational 
network. A connected fund manager may, for example, learn of the details of a 
government policy beforehand and determine which firms it will benefit or when it 
will occur. 
 
The continued employment of fund managers with a Banking background despite 
their poor performance appears puzzling. We provide a potential justification by 
investigating the effect of fund manager work experience on Chinese mutual funds’ 
new money flow growth. Fund managers with a Banking background exhibit a greater 
ability to bring new money flow to the funds. They are better at attracting new money 
than managers with Investment or Research backgrounds, which compensates for 
their poorer fund performances. As a result of the dominance of banks in Chinese 
mutual fund sale channels, expertise and connections through work experiences are 
valuable to mutual fund companies.  
                                                          
19 We do not test for correlation between industry coverage in a fund manager’s 
research analyst career and stock holding because information regarding industry 
coverage in previous analyst careers is not available. 
 
108 
 
Chapter 4 Managers’ Political Connections 
4.1 Introduction 
Our analyses in the previous chapter show the superior stock-picking performance of 
managers with research and government backgrounds but do not reveal the source of 
these abilities. It is plausible that work experience in stock research may better 
prepare a manager for finding and analyzing value-relevant firm information or that a 
manager with this experience has accumulated knowledge of specific firms or 
industries, which leads to a more concentrated portfolio. It is more difficult to imagine 
how a career in government bureaucracy translates into better stock-picking skills. 
These managers may, however, gain an information advantage through their political 
connections. For instance, managers with a government background may gain an 
information advantage through their political connections. In an economy such as 
China, where government influence is ubiquitous, political connections form an 
informational network. A connected fund manager may, for example, learn of details 
of a government policy before it is implemented and determine which firms it will 
benefit. This chapter fills the gap in the literature by investigating the importance of 
political connections for fund managers’ performance and style. 
 
In a transitional economy such as China, a business’s political connections may help 
firms overcome many obstacles to conducting business (i.e., obtaining policy support 
and economic resources) and, thereby, enable private entrepreneurship to flourish 
(Boisot and Child 1996; Xin and Pearce 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000; Li and Zhang, 
2007). Previous studies show that political leaders use their power to grant economic 
favors to connected firms (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006). In 
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the context of the Chinese market, several papers also document a positive effect of 
political connections in privately controlled firms (Li et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008). 
 
A business in transitional economy needs to incent to develop political connection 
relations, because the political government control the core resources in this country. 
Due to the asymmetric information of the state controlled economy, private business 
onwers in such as China, face many obstacles in carrying their businesses. They are 
often hard or take long time to obtain bank loans that are usually largely reserved for 
state-owned enterprises, or to comply with lots of government regulations (red tape) 
or to bear more political or legal costs (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002;  
Guriev, 2004). In addition to the problems of a weak state and ill-functioning markets, 
the legal system in such economies is often too weak to secure property rights and 
enforce contracts (Hay and Shleifer, 1998; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 
2002 and Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000).  
 
As Chinese politicians and officials preserve their power during market transition and 
economic liberalization, they continue to be influential in helping politically 
connected firms obtain a competitive advantage in the market. In fact, economic 
liberalization opens up new opportunities for state actors to not only enhance their 
power in the state-owned sector but also influence business operations in the private 
sector, thereby strengthening firms’ politically based advantages. As economic 
reforms foster greater business opportunities and generate more intensive market 
competition, the latent value of the market opportunities that politicians and officials 
can facilitate for firms becomes higher, which, in turn, means that the economic value 
of such preferential treatment is also higher. 
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In this chapter, we focus on the effect of fund managers’ political connections on their 
managed fund performance and management styles in China. Chinese mutual fund 
data provide us with fund managers’ career history data, which are not readily 
available in other markets. By law, every Chinese fund company needs to release 
information on the career paths of its fund managers. This may be because the fund 
industry in China is a very young market and has recently undergone a rapid 
expansion (since 2003). As a result, mutual funds in China do not always have the 
luxury of nurturing their own talent through in-house training and laddering. Whereas 
the typical career path of a mutual fund manager in the U.S. starts from the junior 
research analyst position following the attainment of an MBA or CFA, Chinese funds 
find asset management talent from a variety of backgrounds. The most significant 
career position of a Chinese fund manager prior to his/her fund managing career could 
be as diverse as, for example, divisional manager of a bank or a government official 
with the securities regulator.  
 
We manually trace fund managers’ political connections by reviewing their previous 
work experience. The fund managers who work in a central or local government 
department at the Chuji Position or higher or in state-owned enterprises as a division 
manager or higher are classified as politically connected. Therefore, we conjecture 
that politically connected managers are more likely to have firm-specific private 
information through their political connections and, consequently, may adjust their 
portfolios in advance of other market participants. 
 
Our results confirm this conjecture and demonstrate a linkage between political 
connections and fund managers’ managerial performance and management styles. 
111 
 
First, fund managers with political connections established during their prior work 
experience in government or state-owned enterprises outperform their counterparts. 
Second, the politically connected managers exhibit relatively stronger stock-picking 
and market-timing abilities. Third, the politically connected fund managers take on 
less market risk and do not chase the momentum strategy in comparison with 
non-politically connected managers.  
 
Fourth, consistent with the information advantage hypothesis, politically connected 
managers hold portfolios with significantly higher concentration ratios. Fifth, 
compared with their non-politically connected counterparts, these managers tend to 
have a higher contribution ratio and return gap.  
 
Our study is of great importance for at least four reasons. First, this study belongs to 
the broad literature on the importance of political connections, as it focuses on the 
effect of political connections on mutual fund performance and managerial styles. 
This helps us better understand the benefits of managerial political resources in the 
employment of mutual fund management and how this type of employment affects 
fund performance and management styles. Second, this study explores the issue of the 
relationship between political ties and management performance and styles and is 
empirically based. This is, in part, motivated by the lack of previous empirical work in 
the area of emerging markets. Therefore, research into this area enhances our 
understanding. Third, China’s stock markets are unique because they are highly 
segmented (i.e., geographic locations and ownership restrictions). Therefore, a study 
in this area sheds additional light onto the behaviors of fund managers. Finally, an 
understanding of the importance of political connections is important not only for 
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business managers who may be interested in corporate control and institutional and 
retail investors who may be interested in stock return and risk but also for regulators, 
as the issue may be related to regulatory features and may impinge on the efficiency 
and operation of capital markets.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3 describes the data and construction of the variables. Section 4 presents the 
empirical analyses. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
Studies on political connections can be related to several strands of literature. In the 
economics and finance literature, Morck and Yeung (2003) point out that political 
connections are also known as political rent seeking, which describes self-interested 
interactions between politicians and business elites. They also indicate that many 
economists use the term corruption rather than illegal transaction to describe political 
connections because political rent seeking is legal in many countries. Many studies 
emphasize that the primary motives of government-linked firms is almost rent 
seeking, extraction and protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Others explore the 
roles and characteristics of political directors in firms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). 
 
The implications of political connections and, in particular, the measurements of how 
to value political connections in the business world are focused on by a growing body 
of economic literature. Research has shown that political connected firms easily take 
benefits and economic favours from polices or regulations set by powerful political 
leaders (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006). Political 
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connections have also been found to help firms secure favourable regulatory 
conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and access resources such as bank loans 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005 and Faccio, 2006), which ultimately increase firm value 
(Roberts, 1990, Fisman, 2001 and Ramalho, 2007) or improve firm performance 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003). In the context of the Chinese market, several papers have 
documented a positive effect of political connection in privately controlled firms (Li 
et al., 2008). 
 
Turning to the empirical studies on the relationship between political connections and 
corporate performance, Fisman (2001) reports that share prices on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange responded negatively to the announcement of bad news concerning the 
health of Suharto, the second president of Indonesia. Analyzing the data of 20,202 
firms in 47 countries, Faccio (2006) observes that share market prices increased 
significantly when top officers or large shareholders of firms entered politics but not 
when politicians joined the boards of firms. Additionally, in a study of firms in 35 
countries, Faccio et al. (2006) find that firms that were economically distressed and 
had political connections were more likely to be bailed out by their governments than 
firms that were economically distressed but did not have political connections. 
Among other things, they also observe that firms that had political connections were 
more economically distressed before they were bailed out than those that did not have 
political connections. 
 
Under ambitious state-guided economic reforms, market development and market 
competition in China have progressed rapidly. For instance, social connections, 
particularly political connections with politicians and government officials, have 
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helped firms overcome many obstacles to conducting business, such as obtaining 
political legitimacy, policy support, and economic resources, and have thereby 
enabled private entrepreneurship to flourish despite serious weaknesses in formal 
market-supporting institutions (Boisot and Child 1996; Xin and Pearce 1996; Peng 
and Luo, 2000; Li and Zhang, 2007).  
 
Notwithstanding the value-enhancing benefits of political connections, such political 
links are not without costs. It has also been noted that there are direct costs to 
establishing and maintaining political connections, which result in political and social 
burdens on firms (e.g., Jia, Wang and Shi, 2012; Calomiris et al., 2010; Fan, et al., 
2007) and indirect costs of politicians’ interference in the firm’s business operations 
(Sun, et al., 2010).  
 
4.3 Data Description 
We use data on the actively traded open-end equity mutual funds in China from 
January 2002 to December 2011.20 Our main sample is created by merging fund data 
from the Wind Database21 with the Tianxiang Database22 and the CSMAR Database. 
The Wind Mutual Fund Database provides information about fund returns and other 
fund and manager characteristics, including fund age, fund size, the fund’s expense 
ratio, fund manager educational background, fund manager age and so forth. We use 
monthly return data throughout the style analysis. Holdings information is only 
available on a semi-annual basis due to reporting requirements. Our stock and market 
returns data come from CSMAR. Our main sample data span from January 2002 to 
                                                          
20 We select “equity” and “equity-majority” for the fund type. We then eliminate 
index funds and international funds from the sample. In addition, we exclude 
observations from funds with less than one year of history. 
21 http://www.wind.com.cn/ 
22 http://www.txsec.com.cn/ 
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December 2011. To limit the effect of possible data error and extreme values, we 
further delete the observations with fund raw returns in the top and bottom 1% of the 
sample. As described in TABLE 4.1, our final sample includes 369 open-ended equity 
funds and 542 fund managers in 48 fund families.  
 
We then manually trace fund managers’ political connections by reviewing their 
previous work experience. We categorize all fund managers who work in a central or 
local government department at the Chuji Position or higher or in state-owned 
enterprises as a division manager or higher into the Political Connection Group. 
Therefore, finally, we have 162 fund managers with significant political connection 
relationships, which is approximately 30% of the sample (TABLE 4.1). 
 
As shown in TABLE 4.1, the average age of all funds is approximately 5 years, and 
the average fund size, measured by the logarithm (10 based) of TNA (in million 
Yuan), is 3.33. Moreover, the mean expense ratio is approximately 0.16% per month, 
which translates to an annual rate of 1.92%. This is in line with other studies of 
Chinese equity funds. In addition, of the Chinese mutual fund managers in our 
sample, 79% are male (sex equals one). Furthermore, 95% of them have a 
postgraduate degree, and 14% of them have engaged in overseas study or work 
experiences. The average fund manager tenure is less than 3 years, which is 
approximately a year shorter than the average tenure of American fund managers in 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999). Many managers manage multiple funds; the average 
number of funds under management is three. 
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TABLE 4.1: Summary Statistics of Fund and Manager Characteristics 
This table summaries statistics for the sample of actively managed Chinese equity 
mutual funds. For dummy variables, the first column (#) reports the number of 
observations for which the dummy variable equals one. 
 
 
# Min Median Mean S.D. Max 
Number of fund-month obs. 10,264      
Number of fund-semi-annual 
obs. 
2,456      
Number of funds  369      
Number of fund managers 542      
Political connection 162 0.00  0.30  1.00 
Fund Characteristics 
Fund age  1.32 5.30 4.96 2.18 10.60 
Log (TNA) (Million Yuan)  1.72 3.41 3.33 0.61 4.52 
Expense ratio (%)  0.00 0.13 0.16 0.01 1.14 
Joint management  4,847 0.00  0.47  1.00 
Managerial replacement  2,722 0.00  0.27  1.00 
Other Manager Characteristics 
Sex  428 0.00  0.79  1.00 
Postgraduate degree  515 0.00  0.95  1.00 
Overseas experience  76 0.00  0.14  1.00 
Fund manager tenure  1.00 3.00 2.66 1.13 8.00 
Fund manager age  27.00 36.00 36.66 3.91 52.00 
# of FUM    1.00 3.00 3.00 1.52 7.00 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Fund Performance and Managers’ Political Connections  
In this section, we employ both the Fama-Macbeth regression approach and rolling 
estimation regression approach to conduct our analysis.  
 
For the Fama-Macbeth regression approach, in each month, we run a cross-sectional 
regression of fund performance on manager career path characteristics while 
controlling for fund and other manager characteristics. That is, we estimate 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛿0,𝑡 + 𝛾1,𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑗
+ 𝛾2,𝑡𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾3,𝑡𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
where 𝛾𝑠 are vectors of coefficient estimates for each month t. We take care to use 
only return data specific to manager j in calculating Performance𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . We then 
report the estimated mean and t-statistics of these coefficients. In the regression, we 
include the dummy variable for political connection, which is 1 if a fund manager is 
in the Political Connection Group and 0 otherwise. 
 
For the rolling estimation regression approach, for the same fund manager, at the end 
of semi-annual SA, we use the past 24 monthly returns to run the following 
regression, 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
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Where 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the excess return of fund i managed by fund manager j over month t, 
𝛽𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴  represents the risk exposures of fund i managed by fund manager j at 
semi-annual SA to the various factors, and 𝑋𝑡 is the monthly value of different 
factors in month t. 
 
Then, we compute Performancei,j,SA  of fund i managed by fund manager j at 
semi-annual SA as 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴 − 𝛽𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴𝑋′𝑆𝐴 
 
Where r𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴  is the excess return of fund i managed by fund manager j for 
semi-annual SA, and 𝑋′𝑆𝐴 is the value of different factors in semi-annual SA. 
 
Because the regression is on a semi-annual basis, we allow Performancei,j,SA and 
𝛽𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴 to be time-varying. Performancei,j,SA measures a fund’s risk-adjusted return 
managed by one fund manager. 𝛽𝑖,𝑗,𝑆𝐴 measures a fund’s exposures to various risk 
factors managed by one fund manager. 
 
Then, we use semi-annual raw return, excess return, CAPM abnormal return and 
four-factor abnormal return as dependent variables to run the Fama-Macbeth 
regression, which estimates the cross-sections regression first and then reports the 
average time series results.  
 
TABLE 4.2 reports the results. Panel A shows the mean estimates and the 
corresponding t-statistics of the regressions using the Fama-Macbeth regression 
approach. Panel B shows the results of the rolling estimation regression approach. 
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Point estimates, shown in Panel A, of the political connection dummy for all 
performance measures are all positive and are mostly significant at least at the 5% 
level. This demonstrates that fund managers with a political connection background 
outperform in terms of both raw return and risk-adjusted abnormal return. Panel B 
shows similar results, as the coefficient estimates for a political connection 
background are all significantly positive. Another observation we make from TABLE 
4.2 is that risk adjustment is of crucial importance for relative performance. The point 
estimate for the political connection dummy increases from 0.57 in the raw return 
regression to 0.71 in the CAPM abnormal returns regression and to 1.01 in the 
four-factor abnormal returns regression. Similarly, in Panel B, it increases from 0.91 
to 1.54 and then to 1.86 and is highly significant. Therefore, risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns can be characterized as a manager’s stock-picking ability that is independent 
of her choice of factor loadings. Therefore, having political connections has a larger 
effect on manager stock-picking abilities.  
 
We now turn our attention to the regression results for the control variables. 
Consistent with the large literature on U.S. mutual funds23, we find that higher 
expense is negatively correlated with fund performance. Coefficient estimates on the 
expense ratio are negative and highly significant across all regressions. Contrary to 
the evidence for U.S. mutual funds24, we find that fund size is positively correlated 
with fund performance, although the significance is limited mostly to regressions of 
individual career background. This finding, however, is consistent with evidence for 
non-U.S. mutual funds (Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013)) and, in 
                                                          
23 See, for example, Carhart (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Wermers 
(2000), among others. 
24 See Chen et al. (2004), Berk and Green (2004), and Pollet and Wilson (2008) for 
studies on fund size and performance. 
120 
 
particular, for Chinese mutual funds (Tang, Wang, and Xu (2012)). Ferreira et al. 
(2013) study the determinants of mutual fund performance in 27 countries and find 
that the U.S. evidence of an adverse scale effect is an exception rather than the norm. 
In terms of other fund characteristics, we find no evidence that fund age is correlated 
with fund performance. This is not surprising given the relatively short history of 
Chinese funds. There is some evidence that jointly managed funds perform worse, but 
these estimates are mostly nonsignificant. Funds seem to perform better in the initial 
three-month period when there is managerial replacement. 
 
Some other manager characteristics seem to affect performance. Fund performance 
decreases with manager tenure. Interestingly, Female managers perform better than 
their male counterparts. In the male-dominated Chinese mutual fund industry, a 
female manager needs to have an extraordinary ability to survive. There is some 
evidence that managers who have a postgraduate degree outperform their counterparts 
who lack such a degree but no evidence that overseas experience leads to better fund 
management ability. Multiple funds under management seem to distract managers, 
and the effect is significant in some regressions. However, a manager’s age does not 
seem relevant. 
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TABLE 4.2: Fund Performance and Managers’ Political Connections 
 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund performances on the political connection 
dummy, fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. Regressions are carried out for each month, and mean coefficient 
estimates are reported. The returns are presented as percentages. The t-statistics use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are in 
parentheses. Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Fund Performance Measures 
 Panel A: Fama-Macbeth Regression Approach   Panel B: Rolling Estimation Regression Approach 
 
 
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret  
Raw Ret Excess Ret 
CAPM Ab. 
Ret 
Four-Factor 
Ab. Ret 
Political connection 
0.57** 0.49** 0.71** 1.01*** 
 
0.91** 1.22*** 1.54** 1.86*** 
(1.99) (2.01) (2.12) (2.59) 
 
(2.37) (3.48) (1.99) (2.84) 
Fund age 
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
0.43 0.28 0.50* 0.41 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) 
 
(0.65) (1.52) (1.68) (1.32) 
Log (TNA) 
0.29 0.30 0.36 0.19 
 
0.33 0.88 0.58 0.50 
(0.84) (0.61) (1.24) (0.41) 
 
(0.12) (1.43) (1.41) (0.71) 
Expense ratio 
-8.18*** -6.43** -6.17* -7.36*** 
 
-13.64*** -9.01*** -8.17** -7.90* 
(-4.47) (-2.14) (-1.83) (-2.84) 
 
(-4.14) (-2.61) (-2.03) (-1.95) 
Joint management 
-0.61** -0.41** -0.16 -0.20 
 
1.24** -1.23* -1.08* -1.06 
(-2.42) (-2.08) (-0.67) (-0.71) 
 
(1.98) (-1.81) (-1.42) (-1.22) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.72* 0.38 0.61** 0.48* 
 
1.38 1.63* 0.85 0.84 
(1.83) (1.20) (1.99) (1.69) 
 
(1.57) (1.89) (1.23) (0.87) 
Fund manager tenure 
-0.03** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.03** 
 
-0.05 -0.07 -0.09* -0.02 
(-2.18) (-2.51) (-2.48) (-2.12) 
 
(-1.54) (-1.57) (-1.93) (-0.13) 
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Sex 
-0.43 -0.18 -0.54*** -0.58** 
 
-1.03 -0.25 -1.25 -0.80 
(-1.64) (-0.12) (-2.58) (-2.51) 
 
(-1.14) (-0.14) (-1.39) (-1.14) 
Postgraduate degree 
0.16** 0.24* 0.29** 0.28** 
 
0.32* 0.19* 0.39** 0.34** 
(1.98) (1.82) (2.49) (2.41) 
 
(1.94) (1.92) (2.01) (2.02) 
Overseas experience 
-0.10 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 
 
1.28 -0.56 -0.16 -0.21 
(-0.41) (-0.74) (-0.51) (-0.78) 
 
(1.48) (-0.63) (-0.06) (-0.17) 
# of FUM 
-0.05* -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
-0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 
(-1.68) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.54) 
 
(-0.31) (-0.17) (-0.19) (-0.26) 
Fund manager age 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
 
-0.17 -0.16 -0.32 -0.24 
(-0.37) (-0.89) (-0.04) (-0.61) 
 
(-0.59) (-1.20) (-1.47) (-0.87) 
CONSTANT 
-0.27 -0.36 -0.58* -0.81** 
 
-1.89 -1.08** -2.14 -2.17 
(-1.08) (-1.48) (-1.72) (-2.42) 
 
(-1.34) (-1.98) (-1.24) (-1.40) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264 
 
2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
Adjusted R2 6.76% 7.02% 7.36% 8.22% 
 
7.13% 7.84% 7.48% 7.31% 
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4.4.2 Factor Loadings and Managers’ Political Connections 
A manager with political connections may easily obtain firm-specific private 
information and take fewer systematic risks. Therefore, they usually do not chase 
momentum and follow market behavior. By the same token, managers who have 
information advantages mostly on growth stocks through their political connections 
are likely to invest more in growth stocks. 
 
4.4.2.1 Raw Factor Loadings  
Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we calculate the beta for each mutual 
fund-month in our sample as the index of systematic risk loading by running the 
CAPM. Meanwhile, we run the Carhart (1997) four-factor regression for each fund to 
estimate its exposure to SMB, HML and MOM factors.  
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where Raw returni,t is the raw return of fund i at time t, rft is the risk-free rate, amd 
MarketRt is the market rate at time t. In addition, this regression introduces the 
independent variables given by the returns of four zero-investment factor portfolios. 
The expression MarketRt - rft denotes the excess return of the market portfolio over 
the risk-free rate. SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt are returns of factor-mimicking portfolios 
of size, value and momentum. A positive (negative) 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵 means that the fund is 
oriented toward small (large) stocks. Similarly, a positive (negative) coefficient 
𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿 indicates that the fund has a tilt toward value (growth) stocks, and a positive 
(negative) 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀 indicates that the fund leans toward momentum (contrarian). We 
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then match estimates of factor loadings to managers and run a Fama-Macbeth 
regression. 
 
TABLE 4.3 shows the results of the raw risk loadings regressed on the manager 
political connection dummy. Panel A reports the Fama-Macbeth regression results, 
and Panel B reports the rolling estimation regression results. Coefficient estimates of 
the political connection dummy are consistent with our expectation in both panels. 
The coefficients of the political connection dummy in the first columns of Panel A 
and Panel B are significantly negative at the 1% level, at -0.12 and -0.07, which 
means that managers with political connections prefer to take fewer market risks. This 
provides support for the view that politically connected managers obtain significant 
information advantages through their connections. Politically connected managers 
also prefer to invest more in growth stocks, as the coefficient in the third column of 
Panel A is -0.10, which is significant at the 1% level. However, in Panel B, it reduces 
to -0.02, which is slightly significant at the 10% level. In addition, for the MOM 
factor, it is significant at the 5% level in both Panel A and Panel B. Therefore, fund 
managers with political connections do not follow the momentum strategy when 
constructing their portfolios because they possess more inside information on 
individual stocks and thus can adjust their portfolios in advance of other market 
participants. However, there is no evidence that these managers prefer large stocks to 
small stocks. 
 
Additionally, larger funds and younger funds, perhaps inevitably, take on more 
market risk. They invest relatively more in growth socks and do not chase momentum. 
In terms of other fund characteristics, we find that funds with higher expense ratios 
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prefer to acquire valued stocks. In addition, jointly managed funds prefer to chase 
momentum in the market. Funds that are managed by fund managers with long 
management tenure take less market risk but bear more of the other factor loadings. 
Female managers take on more risk but have very good fund performance, which 
means they must have an extraordinary ability to survive. Moreover, managers who 
have a postgraduate degree take less risk due to their knowledge, but managers with 
overseas experience prefer to take more risks to construct their fund portfolio. 
Managers with multiple funds under management also seem to chase momentum 
significantly. Finally, older fund managers are likely to take more risk in the market, 
which is consistent with the notion that younger managers outperform in terms of 
more abnormal returns compared with older managers in the Chinese fund market. 
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TABLE 4.3: Raw Factor Loadings and Managers’ Political Connections 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund raw risk loadings on the political connection 
dummy, fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, we use the Fama-Macbeth regression approach to estimate 
risk factors. In Panel B, we use the rolling estimation regression approach to estimate risk factors. The t-stats use Newey-West adjusted 
standard errors and are in parentheses. Time series averages of R2 are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 
1-percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Raw Factor Loadings 
  Panel A: Fama-Macbeth Regression Approach 
 
Panel B: Rolling Estimation Regression 
Approach 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
Political 
connection 
-0.12*** 0.05 -0.10*** -0.05**  -0.07*** 0.01  -0.02* -0.04** 
(-4.23) (1.14) (-3.94) (-2.26)  (-3.42) (0.42) (-1.90) (-2.05) 
Fund age 
-0.01* 0.01 0.01** -0.01**  -0.01*** 0.02  0.02* -0.02* 
(-1.94) (1.27) (2.14) (-2.14)  (-2.67) (0.84) (1.95) (-1.86) 
Log (TNA) 
0.12*** -0.01* -0.06* -0.03**  0.15*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.08*** 
(3.89) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-2.34)  (3.19) (-1.39) (-1.64) (-2.96) 
Expense ratio 
1.05 0.69** 1.24 -0.76  0.77  0.18* 0.56  -0.77 
(0.92) (2.03) (1.61) (-0.76)  (1.00) (1.70) (0.84) (-1.37) 
Joint management 
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05***  -0.02 0.01  -0.01 0.04* 
(-1.45) (0.87) (-1.17) (3.61)  (-1.09) (0.88) (-0.26) (1.68) 
Managerial 
replacement 
-0.06* -0.02 0.02 0.01  -0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.02  
(-1.70) (-0.65) (0.84) (0.47)  (-0.08) (0.31) (-0.11) (0.72) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.01** -0.02 0.03** -0.02  -0.01 -0.01 0.02  -0.01* 
(-2.51) (-1.53) (1.98) (-1.03)  (-1.18) (-0.24) (0.68) (-1.86) 
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Sex 
0.12*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.01  0.09*** 0.01  -0.05 0.03** 
(4.32) (1.43) (-5.57) (0.23)  (3.20) (0.41) (-1.51) (2.00) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
-0.04*** 0.03** 0.07*** -0.01  -0.01 0.04** 0.07** -0.03* 
(-3.44) (2.00) (3.64) (-0.47)  (-0.29) (1.99) (2.10) (-1.81) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.04** -0.05* 0.06*** 0.10***  0.01  -0.02 0.11*** 0.11*** 
(2.11) (-1.68) (3.41) (3.86)  (0.04) (-1.03) (3.98) (2.64) 
# of FUM 
-0.01 -0.03** -0.03 0.05**  -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01 0.02  
(-0.14) (-2.03) (-1.29) (2.07)  (-4.07) (-4.22) (-0.75) (0.32) 
Fund manager age 
-0.01*** -0.02** -0.02 -0.03***  -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01 
(-2.68) (-2.41) (-1.11) (-3.41)  (-3.49) (-1.68) (-2.85) (-0.18) 
CONSTANT 
0.22** -0.08 0.26*** 0.32***  0.17  -0.21* 0.29*** 0.45*** 
(2.23) (-1.01) (4.07) (4.69)  (1.46) (-1.74) (2.84) (5.57) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264  2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
Adjusted R2 6.13% 6.47% 7.07% 6.96%  7.54% 7.17% 7.33% 7.29% 
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4.4.2.2 Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings  
In this section, we study the relationship using factor loadings in excess of median 
loadings of the funds with the same self-reported style characteristics. We also use the 
Fama-Macbeth regression approach and rolling estimation regression approach to 
estimate fund risk loadings. We find similar results if we use the factor loadings 
adjusted for fund style. 
 
TABLE 4.4 reports the results. Coefficient estimates on the political connection 
dummy are similar when using the Fama-Macbeth regression approach (Panel A) and 
rolling estimation regression approach, which is consistent with the results in TABLE 
4.3. Managers with a politically connected background take significantly fewer 
systematic risks and do not chase momentum, which may be due to their information 
advantages on specific firms obtained through their political connections. The 
estimates on control variables are also similar to the previous results.
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TABLE 4.4: Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings and Managers’ Political Connections 
 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of fund style adjusted risk loadings on the political 
connection dummy, fund characteristics and other manager characteristics. In Panel A, we use the Fama-Macbeth regression approach to 
estimate risk factors adjusted by fund style. In Panel B, we use the rolling estimation regression approach to estimate risk factors adjusted 
by fund style. The t-stats use Newey-West adjusted standard errors and are in parentheses. Time series averages of R2 are also reported. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Fund Style Adjusted Factor Loadings 
  Panel A: Fama-Macbeth Regression Approach 
 
Panel B: Rolling Estimation Regression 
Approach 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
 
Systematic 
risk 
SMB HML MOM 
Political 
connection 
-0.11*** 0.03 -0.08** -0.04**  -0.06*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.02** 
(-3.84) (0.74) (-2.27) (-2.04)  (-2.86) (0.84) (-1.54) (-2.34) 
Fund age 
-0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01  -0.02*** 0.01 0.01** -0.03** 
(-0.27) (0.24) (0.35) (-0.14)  (-5.04) (1.26) (2.05) (-2.23) 
Log (TNA) 
0.26 -0.02** -0.04 -0.01  0.17 -0.03*** -0.02 -0.09*** 
(1.59) (-1.98) (-1.32) (-1.36)  (1.52) (-2.78) (-1.18) (-4.88) 
Expense ratio 
1.02* 1.44*** 1.13 -0.83*  0.92 0.19 0.42 -0.80 
(1.87) (3.27) (1.39) (1.43)  (1.11) (0.30) (0.46) (-1.36) 
Joint management 
-0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.03***  -0.05*** 0.01* -0.01 0.02 
(-6.07) (1.49) (-3.75) (4.52)  (-2.62) (1.84) (-0.62) (1.20) 
Managerial 
replacement 
-0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.03  -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
(-0.52) (-0.71) (0.37) (1.61)  (-0.58) (0.61) (-0.14) (1.07) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
-0.01 -0.02 0.01** -0.02**  -0.01 -0.01** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
(-0.31) (-1.42) (1.98) (-2.18)  (-0.36) (-2.45) (3.87) (-4.11) 
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Sex 
0.04 0.08 -0.12*** 0.04  0.07** 0.01 -0.08*** 0.05* 
(0.29) (1.44) (-8.27) (0.74)  (2.21) (0.59) (-2.74) (1.88) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
-0.06*** 0.03* 0.07*** -0.01  -0.01 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.05** 
(-3.90) (1.86) (4.39) (-0.42)  (-0.14) (3.30) (2.90) (-1.92) 
Overseas 
experience 
0.01 -0.02 0.14*** 0.07***  0.01 -0.01 0.14*** 0.05** 
(0.41) (-1.19) (10.85) (5.84)  (0.27) (-0.62) (5.05) (2.14) 
# of FUM 
-0.02 -0.01** -0.05** 0.01  -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02 0.01 
(-1.01) (-2.03) (-2.54) (0.68)  (-4.00) (-2.94) (-0.19) (0.37) 
Fund manager age 
-0.01*** -0.04** -0.01** -0.01  -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01 
(-2.97) (-2.01) (-2.46) (-1.37)  (-2.97) (-1.81) (-4.63) (-0.41) 
CONSTANT 
0.12* -0.26*** 0.28*** 0.21*  0.12 -0.07 0.02** 0.09** 
(1.69) (-3.16) (3.53) (1.89)  (1.13) (-0.82) (2.04) (2.02) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 10,264 10,264  2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092 
Adjusted R2 7.02% 7.35% 8.14% 8.68%  7.21% 7.14% 7.35% 7.54% 
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4.4.3 Stock-picking Ability and Managers’ Political Connections 
Our analysis in the previous sections suggests that managers who are politically 
connected possess an information advantage and outperform those with no political 
connections. We conjecture that this information advantage equips these fund 
managers with stronger stock-picking and market-timing abilities. To confirm our 
conjecture, we examine the stock-picking and market-timing abilities of fund 
managers with political connections using fund holdings data in the following two 
sections. By examining the fund holding data, we are able to study managers’ stock 
picking and portfolio construction while avoiding potential risks arising from relying 
on short time-series return data (Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010)) and, thus, 
better test our hypotheses.  
 
We begin by examining fund managers’ stock-picking ability. We focus on the 
Concentration Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the market value of the top 10 
stock holdings over the total market value of a fund’s equity portfolio. We further 
study fund managers’ consistency in picking stocks using a simple metric, the 
proportion of performance-contributing stocks in a portfolio. Specifically, if in a 
portfolio of n stocks, the number of stocks for which excess returns beat the 
style-specific median is denoted k, we calculate k/ n. We refer to this measure as the 
contribution ratio. A higher contribution ratio indicates that a manager is likely to 
possess a consistent information advantage rather than simply being lucky. Finally, 
we examine the return gap, which is computed as the difference between the fund 
return and the hypothetical return of portfolio holdings, following Kacperczyk et al. 
(2008). The return gap measures the unobserved actions of fund managers in timely 
trading stocks based on their private information. Kacperczyk et al. (2008) 
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demonstrate that the return gap is positively correlated with performance persistence. 
Then, we run the above measures through the Fama-Macbeth procedure on firm 
characteristics, manager characteristics and the political connection dummy.  
 
TABLE 4.5 reports the results. Fund managers with political connections show a 
much higher Concentration Ratio (i.e., 2.78), which is significantly positive. They 
also include more contributed stocks in their portfolio, as the coefficient estimate of 
the contribution ratio is 0.17, which is also significantly positive. In addition, the 
coefficient estimate of return gap on political connection is 0.30, which is also 
significantly positive at the 5% level. These fund managers have sufficient 
information advantages due to their political connections that allow them to adjust 
their portfolio to achieve better performance on the short-term trading measure. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers with political connections 
possess stock-picking skills. Their higher abnormal returns, which we describe in this 
chapter, are achieved through picking and concentrating on some well-performing 
stocks, which managers could obtain information on through their political 
connections.  
 
We also note some interesting patterns for the control variables in TABLE 4.5. Larger 
funds seem to have more information advantages in acquiring stocks. Younger 
managers show a poor ability to choose high-performance stocks because of 
insufficient industry experience. We do not find evidence that managers’ better 
educational background significantly affects their stock-picking ability.  
133 
 
TABLE 4.5: Stock-picking Ability and Managers’ Political Connections 
 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
holdings-based measures on the manager political connection dummy, fund 
characteristics and other manager characteristics. Concentration Ratio is defined as 
the ratio of the market value of the top 10 stock holdings over the total market value 
of a fund’s equity portfolio. Contribution Ratio is defined as the proportion of the 
number of stocks for which excess returns beat the style-specific median in a 
portfolio. Return Gap is computed as the difference between the fund return and the 
hypothetical return of portfolio holdings. The returns are presented as percentages. 
The t-stats are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 
1-percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Holding-based Measures Referring to Stock-picking Ability 
 
Concentration Ratio Contribution Ratio Return gap 
Political connection 
2.78*** 0.17** 0.30* 
(2.89) (2.20) (1.82) 
Fund age 
0.08 0.02 0.01* 
(0.78) (1.01) (1.68) 
Log (TNA) 
1.90*** 0.03*** 1.67*** 
(3.69) (3.64) (5.25) 
Expense ratio 
-12.34 -1.21*** -4.01*** 
(-0.74) (-5.28) (-6.14) 
Joint management 
0.56 0.01* -0.08 
(1.52) (1.68) (-0.35) 
Managerial 
replacement 
1.08 0.02** 1.69 
(1.11) (2.05) (0.18) 
Fund manager 
tenure 
0.22** -0.03* 0.12 
(2.49) (-1.95) (0.15) 
Sex 
-1.87*** 0.03** -2.03 
(-2.78) (1.98) (-1.04) 
Postgraduate 
degree 
0.28 0.01 1.30 
(0.12) (0.87) (0.97) 
Overseas experience 
-1.13** -0.03* -2.11* 
(-2.06) (-1.71) (-1.72) 
# of FUM 
-0.31* -0.02 0.17 
(-1.83) (-0.69) (0.21) 
Fund manager age 
-0.03** -0.01*** -0.03 
(-2.04) (-2.86) (-1.49) 
CONSTANT 
-3.72** -0.24** -0.59*** 
(-2.00) (-2.47) (-5.79) 
Obs. 2,456 2,456 2,456 
Adjusted R2 5.15% 5.41% 5.91% 
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4.4.4 Market-timing Ability and Managers’ Political Connections 
We further examine how political connections affect mutual fund managers’ ability to 
time the market, that is, the ability to increase a fund’s exposure to the market index 
prior to market advances and to decrease exposure prior to market declines. Bollen 
and Busse (2001) propose the four-factor TM regression and four-factor HM 
regression to measure the market-timing ability of mutual fund managers.  
 
As introduced in Chapter 3, the four-factor TM regression is 
r𝑝,𝑡 = α𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝,𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡
2
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 
 
and the four-factor HM regression is  
r𝑝,𝑡 = α𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝,𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑚,𝑡
∗
4
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 
 
We estimate parameters of the two models using monthly data to obtain 𝛾𝑝  to 
measure the market-timing ability of fund managers. Then, we run a Fama-Macbeth 
regression using 𝛾𝑝 as the dependent variable. 
 
TABLE 4.6 presents the results. The coefficient estimate of the political connection 
dummy in both the TM and HM regressions is significantly positive (0.12 and 0.09, 
respectively). This indicates that fund managers with a politically connected 
background have a better market-timing ability to adjust their portfolios for short-term 
performance because of information advantages.  
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The results in TABLE 4.6 also show that managers of younger funds or funds with 
lower expense ratios experience difficulty in timing the market. However, fund 
managers with more related experience present better market-timing skills. In 
addition, fund managers with a higher educational background are good at timing 
their trading because of their knowledge and experience; thus, they could easily obtain 
time trading information from the market. However, female fund managers and those 
with overseas experience do not exhibit significant market-timing skills in 
constructing their fund portfolios. Therefore, they must have other undisclosed skills 
or relationships that contribute to their fund performance. 
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TABLE 4.6: Market-timing Measures and Managers’ Political Connections 
 
This table reports the mean coefficient estimates of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of 
market timing measures, which are four-factor TM regression and four-factor HM 
regression on the manager political connection dummy, fund characteristics and other 
manager characteristics. The returns are presented as percentages. The t-stats are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: Market Timing Measures 
 
TM HM 
Political connection 
0.12*** 0.09*** 
(3.19) (2.99) 
Fund age 
-0.03** -0.02** 
(-2.03) (-2.02) 
Log (TNA) 
0.03 0.07* 
(1.31) (1.69) 
Expense ratio 
7.59*** 9.26*** 
(7.72) (9.17) 
Joint management 
0.13*** 0.15*** 
(3.23) (3.35) 
Managerial 
replacement 
0.01 0.02 
(0.04) (0.27) 
Fund manager tenure 
0.03* 0.07** 
(1.93) (2.27) 
Sex 
-0.09** -0.17** 
(-2.18) (-2.43) 
Postgraduate degree 
0.25*** 0.21*** 
(2.75) (2.58) 
Overseas experience 
-0.18*** -0.12** 
(-3.69) (-1.98) 
# of FUM 
-0.03 -0.03 
(-1.01) (-1.01) 
Fund manager age 
-0.02 -0.01 
(-1.51) (-1.47) 
CONSTANT 
-0.42 -0.24 
(-0.98) (-1.09) 
Obs. 10,264 10,264 
Adjusted R2 12.16% 12.29% 
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examine how fund managers’ political connections influence their 
managed fund performance and their management styles. We provide evidence that fund 
managers’ political networking significantly affects their managed mutual funds. Specifically, 
we classify the fund managers who work in a central or local government department 
at the Chuji Position or higher or in state-owned enterprises as a division manager or 
higher into the Political Connection Group. Then, we find that fund managers with 
political relationships established during their prior work experience in government or 
state-owned enterprises outperform other managers. Furthermore, fund managers who are 
politically connected also take on less market risk and do not pursue the momentum strategy.  
 
To further investigate the information advantage hypothesis, we examine the stock 
holdings of the politically connected group. Our results are consistent with the 
information advantage hypothesis that fund managers with political connections can obtain 
more inside information when constructing and adjusting their fund portfolios and, thus, can 
outperform those managers without political relationships.  
 
Specifically, we document that managers with political connections hold portfolios 
with a significantly higher concentration ratio. They have also a higher contribution 
ratio and return gap.  
 
Our analyses also show the superior stock-picking and market-timing abilities of 
managers with political relationships, as it is easy and clear to understand how careers 
offering political connections lead to better stock-picking and market-timing skills. 
Those managers can obtain more inside information through their political 
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connections. As described in the substantial literatures related to the Chinese political 
market, the government’s influence is ubiquitous; therefore, political connections 
form an informational network. A connected fund manager can, for example, learn 
about the details of a government policy before it is implemented and determine 
which firms it will benefit or when it will occur. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
In real life, considerable emphasis is placed on work experiences in hiring decisions. 
However, empirical evidence that work experience matters is very limited. This thesis 
fills this gap. We provide evidence that work experience influences manager 
performance and management style and that these effects are consistent with the 
comparative advantage that managers accumulate along their career paths. Examining 
a sample of Chinese mutual funds, we find that managers with a government 
background or a research background display better stock-picking and market-timing 
abilities, although sources of their information advantage likely differ. Benchmarking 
against managers with banking experience, the type of work experience that leads to 
the lowest fund management performance, we find that managers with a government 
background, on average, have the highest risk-adjusted returns while holding the most 
concentrated portfolios and bearing the least amount of market risk. Managers with a 
research background also outperform. They are the least prone to adopt a momentum 
strategy and hold the second most concentrated portfolios. In contrast, we find that the 
high raw returns of managers with an investment background are most attributable to 
the high systematic risk that these managers hold and their tendency to lean more 
toward the momentum strategy. Although fund managers with a banking background 
underperform their counterparts from other backgrounds, we also find that they have 
specific channels that attract new money flows to their funds. Then, we examine 
managers with political connections. Demonstrating the same results as those of 
mangers with a government background, managers with a politically connected 
background significantly outperform others. Furthermore, they exhibit stronger 
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investment abilities to manage their portfolios through picking individual stocks or 
timing their trading.  
 
We believe that the significant effect of manager work experience on fund 
management performance and styles that we document is not limited to the Chinese 
mutual fund industry. Although the specifics of which past work experiences lead to 
better fund management performance may be peculiar to the sample that we study, we 
believe that the notion that a mutual fund manager’s professional experience 
influences her asset managing performance and style should hold more broadly. Part 
of this connection between work experience and fund management is likely due to the 
comparative advantage that a fund manager accumulates along her career path, 
regardless of whether it refers to industry knowledge, information networks, or market 
sense. After all, the formation of human capital is a cumulative process. 
 
Our future studies will examine fund managers with a research background. These 
managers consistently exhibit similar but slightly weaker performance compared with 
those with a government background. Therefore, we consider that they may also have 
inside information due to their analysis skills. Is this true? How do managers with a 
research background obtain “information advantages”? Do these mangers continue to 
invest in the same industries or individual stocks that they previously researched? Do 
investment styles change if we classify buy-side and sell-side for managers with a 
research background? To address these questions, we need to manually collect more 
personal data on fund managers with a research background, such as the industries or 
individual stocks that they researched previously. 
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We also want to study fund managers with a banking background. Do fund families 
decide to hire these fund managers only because of the large new cash flows that they 
can attract? Is there any other advantage that these managers should have to survive? 
This study may require interviews with these fund managers or managers of fund 
families. Furthermore, we need to improve our measures of managers’ previous work 
experience.  
 
In addition, in future research, we can widely extend to other mutual fund markets 
because human resources are a global issue. When any company reviews the resumes 
of applicants, especially high-level managers, work experience and achievements 
must be given primacy. Therefore, how work experience affects managers’ future 
performance and decisions is a worthy and in-depth question. 
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APPENDIX 
Career Scoring System 
To classify each manager’s career into a unique career background, according to 
Table 24, we assign a position score of 1-4 to each career position according to the 
level of the position in the career ladder within each of the four working experiences 
which includes Government, Investment, Research and Banking. We then for each 
manager calculate a categorical ID score of 
Categorical ID Scorej = ∑ Position Scorej,k
Tenurej,k
Total Tenure
4
k=1 , 
 
Where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 is the score of career position k in working experience j, 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 is the number of years a manager spent on position k of experience j, and 
Total Tenure is the total number of years of prior working experiences a fund 
manager have. We then assign the categorical ID of the highest score as each 
manager’s primary career background. 
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Table A: Career Scoring System 
This table summarises the position score we assign to calculate categorical ID score of 
each manager’s career path. We then assign the categorical ID of the highest score as 
a manager’s primary career background. 
 
Score 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Government 
Level Staff Senior Staff Keji-level Chuji-level 
# of fund mangers 26 53 46 17 
Panel B: Investment  
Level Trader 
Investment 
manager 
Assistant 
Director 
(Investment) 
Director 
(Investment) 
# of fund mangers 274 224 126 74 
Panel C: Research 
Level Analyst 
Senior Analyst 
(or Academic) 
Assistant 
Director 
(Research) 
Director 
(Research) 
# of fund mangers 323 138 (16) 94 46 
Panel D: Banking 
Level Staff 
Senior 
Manager 
Sub-branch 
Manager 
Division 
Manager 
# of fund mangers 26 72 5 29 
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